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/in t ro du c tory_no te 
Introductory note 
This paper contains the results of the research work conducted by 
the Joint CEPAL/CTC Unit concerning the activities of transnational 
corporations (TNCs) in the banana industry of Central American countries. 
Parts I and II review selected aspects of the international banana 
industry and give profiles of the main TNCs operating in Central America. 
Part III summarizes the evolution of the U.S. banana industry and its 
expansion in Central America. Finally, parts IV and V overview the 
banana industry and recent government policies in terms of the region 
as a whole and, in more detail, with regard to the particular policy 
changes in the mid 1970s in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama. 
In the parts III through V of the paper, an attempt has been made 
to underline some important aspects of the common research framework of 
the Interregional CEPAL/ECA/ESCAP Project, / such as United Fruit original 
monopoly and vertical integration; increase in TNCs competition due to 
natural, technological and legal changes (in the United States) and 
different TNCs strategies confronting them; the factors of Central American 
countries dependence on .TNCs dominated banana industry and of production and 
export diversification; government and puttie sector policies of the mid 
1970s .leading to a greater national control and redistribution of gains 
in the Central American banana industry and, finally, different TNCs 
counterstrategies in disinvestment, cutting of production and exports, 
political pressures, etc. 
\f See B, Widyono, Transnat:ijopal, tolerations in ̂ port-oriented 
Primary Commodities^ A .Study, a f̂ jjelajt iv ê  Baraalnipĝ  Pô itiorvs , 
and |Gains, Joint CEPAL/CTC Unit, Working Paper N°6, August, 1977, 
and the new version prepared by the Joint ESCAP/CTC Unit in .. 
September 1973. ' ' , ; 
/For various 
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For various reasons, however—particularly lack of more detailed 
information and shortage of resources in the Unit—it has not been 
possible'to analyse the.new aspects of the Central American countries' 
bargaining capacity and resulting distribution of gains in a more -
coherent and systematic way, as -would have been desirable'according to 
the above mentioned common research framework. An exercise seeking to 
make a synthetic evaluation of the experience of some Latin American 
countries with the TNCs in the,bauxite, tin. and banana industries is 
currently being undertaken. . .-• . - -
Parts I, II: and V.1 1. , of this, paper correspond to an earlier study, 
by the Unit's consultants, Professors'I. A.. Litvak and C. J..:Maule 
published by the Unit'in,1977; Part III and section 2 of Part. V are 
based ion^he research work undertaken by-a former staff member of the 
Unit, 0. Hoelscher, and Part IV of the paper corresponds t° a.report by 
the: Unit 's - consultant G. Pavez. \J The paper as. a whole has • been.., edited 
by the- Regional Adviser on TNCs , J, Kfiakal. 
Finally, j while this paper, was pi-eparpd solely for\y,se by ;the 
Interregional Expert Group Meeting on Bargaining Capacity and Distribution 
of- Gains in Export-Oriented Primary Commodities (Bangkok, 8-13:October 1979), 
critical comments and complementary information would be particularly 
welcomed from government officials, experts and academic circles of 
Centra] American and. Caribbean countries in order to assist in the 
preparation of a definitive C£PAL„ study for the forthcoming Interregional 
Seminar of Government Representatives to be held.next, year-in New York. 
\J See, Dr. I.A. Litvak and Dr. C. J, Maule, Transnational porporajiipnjs 
in the banmna^iji^sj^yvd.th_ sP^eci_aeferenc^e to Centra^ America^ 
and Panama, Division of Economic Development, Joint CEPAL/CTC Unit, 
VJorking Paper N°7, August, 1977 and Guillermo Pavez, La actividad 
bananera en "el̂  Istmo Centro_a7̂ ericano y J-aŝ ppli;ticas recientes, 
Limitado, CEPAL/MB</77/20/Rev. 1, June 1978. ' • 
/Part I 
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" • • Part I' -
SELECTED ASPÈCTS OF lié'" BANANA INDUSTRY • '» ; 
1«, Production process ; fv.i.-. 
* Thé battana.plant is ¡a giant herb which grows year-round in various 
climatic regions .from dry subtropical to wet tropical» Bananas require 
50-60 inches of rainfall per annum and a mean te rape ratur'è òf r*80 F, 
. The plant is an, annual which usually' produces fruit for 5 to 20 
years, 1/ and. sometimes longer.. ' • 
... The banana has an underground stem or rhizome from which' föotö, 
. guck^rs and pseudostem grow» The blossom stem which produc'ès the fruit 
emerges from the. pseudostem. The "suckers are capable o'f producing new 
pseudostems thereby renewing the productive"'cycle "after the bunch of 
bananas has been harvested« '" 1 ' : " 
, ..The size of banana groves and plantations Varies widely fròm 
...small, independent land holdings of less than 25' äcres to1 huge'banana 
plantations of the transnational companies» These''companies organize 
their .operations by divisions which generally range iiir size from ' 
10,000' to 30,000 acres. Each division is divided into unit farms 
of. from 5.OO to 1,000 acres, each operated' as a separate"unit-.2/; 
_ . . The process of cultivating bananas includ'ès thè following 
operations :3/ . ! ' ' ' ' - . " • 
(1) clearing virgin forests " 
;., (2) plowing ' '" 1 "•*' 
(3) establishing an appropriate draining system s> 
(k) contouring of sloping land - > - ; ' v 
(5) planting including- seédrselection and appropriate spacing 
1/ H.B. Arthur, J.P. Houck and G^L. Beckford, Tropical Agribusiness, 
Structures and Adjustments - Bananas, Division of Research, 
Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 
./ ; Boston, 196&,;.p.> ^7= . . ' "' 
2/ Ibid., p. 53. '- --y'- .*"••, • •'* A .. -, " "• , 
3/ Ibid., p. 50. 
/(6) weed 
- î o -
Cô) weed control by cutlassing, mulching, cover plants or 
chemicals 
(7) pruning -i>e.^ selection of suckers to follow the parent plan-
and removal of those not selected 
(8) irrigation and fertilisation 
. (9) disease and pest control 
This last operation requires elaboration«, The major disease 
problems have been sigatoka <?r leaf: stop, disease which is controlled 
by manual or aerial spraying : and Panama-disease. . Originally- Panatna 
disease was "controlled" either by abandonment of infected areas, or by 
a technique known as flood following whereby banana lands were 
surrounded with.dykes and flooded for periods varying.from four months 
to one year.1/ .,These practices have been discontinued due to the .shift 
..away from the,.iQroa Hichel variety of; ¡banana to the disease resistant 
Cavendish variety in the early 1960s. Insect protection is.provided by 
placing polyethylene bags, over the growing bunch of fruit. 
, Harvesting involves cutting down the unripe bunch of ...bananas and 
then cutting down the pseudostera so that the productive cycle may begin 
again with a new sucker from the original rhizome. It -takes , 
approximately 9 months for the first- bananas to be harvested and 
3 months for each subsequent harvest. • 
Bunches of- barjanas; are then transported from the fields to the 
boxing station. The fruit companies have installed cable .conveyor 
systems from the field to the boxing -stations -to handle this operation. 
Upon arrival at the boxing station clusters of bananas, are desteramed 
and placed in .a washing- -tub. They are then weighed,,-graded,, and 
selected for export. 
Bananas chosen, for.export,, after weighing and grading, are placed 
in corrugated cardboard boxes with plastic linings, which weigh 
bO pounds when filled. The best grade bananas are marked with brand 
1/ S. May and G. Plaza, The United Fruit Company in Latin America, 
National Planning Association, Washington, D.C., 1.958» P» 
./name s, and 
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names, and the seconds are unmarked yet still shipped for export. 
Rejects are usually ,sold locally. Quality control is an important 
aspect of the entire process from the time the stem is cut until the 
clusters are packed. 
The bananas are then transported from the boxing station to the 
shipping port in unrefrigerated box cars. Often the fruit companies own 
bpth the land transportation system - e.g., railway - and the shipping 
port and loading facilities. The bananas are then loaded on refrigerated 
ships or reefers. Some, of the reefer boats are company-owned. However, 
there is a trend towards long-term leasing of reefer boats due to the 
rising .price of boats, and the emergence of independent reefer tonnage 
pools which exhibit potentially greater flexibility than a company-owned 
fleet.1/ Spoilage can occur if there is a delay in loading from the 
box cars to the reefers. 
In the importing country the bananas are unloaded and transferred 
to refrigerated trucks which transport the fruit to a ripening plant. 
In the United States the major importing firms sell the bananas to 
independent.ripener-jobbers, produce and grocery wholesalers, and ' 
corporate grocery chains. In other countries the fruit companies 
perform their, own ripening and further distribution. Any bananas which 
cannot be ,SQld;at dockside are called "rollers", which are placed on 
trucks and dispatched to an inland destination in the hope of a sale 
w.̂ iile. the .load is. in transit.2/ 
, . The technology, of ripening allows the ripener to advance or 
retard the speed of ripening by introducing or withholding ethylene gas 
.from;the ripening room and also by controlling temperature and humidity. 
Ripeners are therefore able to make short-run adjustments in the supply 
of bananas,. Other, functions performed by the ripener may include 
wrapping and price-marking of individual bunches, direqt delivery to 
retailer's store or warehouses in refrigerated trucks, and sometimes the 
extension of short-term credit. 
1/ UNCTAD (24 Dec. 1974) TD/B/C.l/l62,"The Marketing and Distribution 
• System for Bananaspages 45» 48. ".. ./;..... 
2/ 65 per cent - 70 per cent of fresh fruit is shipped by truck in 
the United States. 
/The final 
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,The final handler of the bananas is "the Retailer who usually : 
takes title to the bananas a few days before peak ripeness» 
thus .shelf-life is usually three days. 
The production flow of bananas from grower'to United'States 
consumer .in the export market is shown by stages, in Figure '1, togéther 
with the main activities undertaken at each stage. The following joints 
should Çe nçted: ;;; 
1. The number of arms-length transactions varieà from two tb fburI 
between grower and consumer, in the case of the transnationals whièh 
grow arid ship to the United States and distribute through a chain 
grocery store, the first transaction takes place at dockside in the 
United States and the second at the retail level' to the consumer.- In 
the case of the Associate Producer which sells to the transnational in 
the producing country, the first transaction takes place in the producing 
country, the second at dockside to a ripener-jobber or a chain, thé ' 
third t.o retail outlets and the fourth to the consumer in the' case of' 
the ripener-jobber, and the third to the consumer in the case of tfte 
chain. ' * ' 
2. In the case of independent producers, mainly in Ecuador and' 
Colombia, shipments are made by independent shippers to the United ' 
States market.- ' • 
3. The output of Associate Producers i^ inspected by the shipper 
while being boxed. Spot inspection of bananas is made at dockside in 
the United States. 
4. Risk associated with the perishability of the produce once picked 
occurs under the following circumstances: 
(a) Delay in transporting bananas in unrefrigerated box-
cars to dockside and delay in loading the reefers. 
(b) Malfunctioning of refrigeration system on reefers, ! 
e.g., a leaky hatch. Also bananas picked at tWo different 
: , ^ locations and at,.different .stages of maturation' may ''' 
activate the ripening process, if shipped in the same 
hold. .  ; f<.. .. 
; /Figure 1 
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Figure 1 
BANANA PRODUCTION FLQH 
GROWER TO'CONSUMER '• 
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(c) Once bananas have arrived at dockside in the United 
States at the correct temperature and degree of 
maturity, the ripening process can be activated in 
ripening rooms whenever the ripeners decide to do so. 
After the ripening process is begun, using ethylene 
gas, there is a set time until the bananas rot; thus 
ripeners must get bananas into stores allowing for a 
shelf life of 2 to 3 days. 
(d) An independent shipper attempting to ship from a 
Central American country, where the dock facilities 
are owned by one of the transnational companies, may 
find it difficult to obtain a berth to coincide with 
the arrival of the shipment at dockside. The risk of 
a rotten shipment is thus higher for independent shippers. 
5. In the United States, the 1958 Consent Decree with United Brands 
prevented the importing companies from retaining title to the banana 
shipment once unloaded. The practice for Castle and Cooke and Del 
Monte is to sell at dockside«. The independent shippers do the 
same«. De facto, the Consent Decree appears to apply to all importers 
in the United States. r 
6. None of the banana reefers is under United States registry 
although some are United States owned. Registry is mainly Panamanian, 
Liberian and European. • 
A banana plantation requires a physical capital infrastructure 
which includes the following: a transportation system from field to 
packing shed, usually an overhead cable"system; a packing shed 
operation; a transportation system from shed to dockside, usually a. 
railway; dockside loading facilities; a box-making plant; machine 
shops; housing and facilities for workers; pumping stations for spray 
irrigation and fertilization. Some or all of this infrastructure . 
may be owned by the plantation«. Associated with the machinery stnd 
equipment is the requirement for servicing and maintenance, which 
is crucial for the uninterrupted flow of banana production from 
grower to consumer« • 
/Large scale 
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Large scale banana pro^nat^on .requires.a.high level of fixed 
investments. For example, Castle and Cooke spent 11 million dollars 
to open up.|L pj^tgtj,^AT. J&ÍL£E4P.Í. Cos^i .Rica in 
1970 = 1/ This,..inyéstriejjt̂ would .tfto.se countries which 
have a less developed .dnfrastructuye. t,-. 
2. Production and Trade Statistics 
Central America accounted for 13 per cent of world banana 
production xn 1973 with Honduras and Costa Ri'éa being the principal 
producers. 'Other major, producers are Brazil^'with 21 per cent,. 
Ecuador with" 9 per cent and India with 8 per., cent of world '.production. 
In total 58 per cent of banana production takes place in the; Western 
v- . -
Hemisphere s table . . . .1 .  
There is a markfe'd difference among countries with **e&pécfc -to 
yield per fteptare, as.vt.able 2 illustrates. Tiie' enormous range'oí 
production yields per hectare, 4,571 in Panamá to 32,500 in Go-sta Rica 
is due to a variety offactors - climatic and^soil conditions,^" 
fertilization'of soil, 'management;skills and si'2e of plantation. The 
high yield countries tend to experience favourábie'-élimatlc conditions, 
are host to foreign companies which own/administer large,janana.., 
plantations which are.well fertilized and where bananas are.^rown 
intensively«*-" On small'-'farms, bananas are often grown interspersed with 
other crops.,*,.90 that the."yield per hectare is naturally letss. "' 
Blowdowns and flooding resulting from hurricanes, and diseas'e'will often 
reduce yields in a particular region at certain times, só tjaat' yield 
variations .hax.e tP.Jbe. laterprjtg.4, with.jpare., .... 
Central .America accounted f o r ^ 6 per cent'Of • wórld baaas^ exports 
by volume in 1973» compared to I3.3 per cent of world banana production. 
The other major exporting country was Ecuador with 21 per cent of world 
exports by volume and 17»3 per cent by value - table 3» 
1/ . Castle and Cooke Inc., Annual Report, 1970, p. 15» 
/Table 1 
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Tabla 1 
BANANÀ PäOÖUCTlÖN By COUNTRIES ' 




0 en tage 
Amount . 
Par-
0 en tage 
Central Amerloa . . . . .. 
Honduras 1 500 4.4 1 6 0 0 4.6, 
Costa Rica 1 250 >7 1 3 0 0 3-7 
Panama 1 013 3.» 9*° 2.7 
Guatemala '. -.• 49* '• 1.5'."- 520 .. 1.5 
Nlaaragua 219 0.6 240 0 . 7 
El Salvador 50 0 . 1 '"' ' 53 * 0.2 
B0U20 '. 3 : \ 3 : •  r 
Subtotal U 530 I2il 4 6 7 6 . 12& 
Rest of Amerloa : 15 2 6 6 . 15 678 " .! : 44.8 
Asia 9 445 27.9 , . y s i 7 28.1 
Afrioa 3 937 11.6 ' 4 117 ' 11.8 
Europe 492 -.. l . i 520-V-. 1.5 
Ooeanla 1 7 0 : 9*5 1 7 0 0.4 
To^al 33 840 , 100.0 100.0 
Inoluded above are the following 
œajor produoers outside , 
Central Ameriaa: 
Brazil 7 3 0 0 2«.9 
Eouador. 3 «0Q . j . 8.< 
India 2 900 8.3 
Burundi 1520 t.3 
Thailand ' " > ' 1 25P : . 3.6 
Philippines 1 180 3.4 
Mexioo 1 US 3 . 2 
S«uroe; Food and Agriculture Organization «f the United Natlens, Production . 
Yearbook 1973, vol. "¿J, Reme, ltfk, page 1Ö2. 
/Table 2 
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T a b l e ' 2 fc. 'î 
WORLD BÄlMiNÄ BÎKûBCTIÔN. ÏIEfiD '.PES .HECXàRB,^ 







' » ^Guatemala.'. - . 
N ioaraguà , 
,'..••' £1 Salvador 
B e l i z e 
•  - v: ' . 




8 5 25. 
6 ..poo 
5 699 . 
5.600 
Rest of America 18 ; 3 
A s i a 10 883 
ATri'oa l<i . £02 : v i 
Europe .1+15 , 
Oaaania - • 6 607 , 
Source t ?ood,and A g r i o u l i w r e Organ izat ion ; of the Uhited Nat i oris, Produot len . 




BAflÈNA EXPORTS BY QUANTITY AND VALUE . .. . 
1973 wr 
Amount P e r - Va l ue P e r -
(metr io centi ( m i l l i o n s cent 
t o n s ) age of üs$> ' age 
Cent r a l Amaria^ 
Honduras 999 400 15.1 9^.9 I5 .O 
Costa R ioà 1 0 3 0 000 15.5 6 7 . 0 . 13.8 
• Panama 540 000 8 .2 65 .0 . . . . . .10 .3 
Guatemala"- 220 000 3 . 3 15.4 . 2 . 4 
N icaragua 105 0 0 0 1.6 l o . o 1 .6 
£1 Sa lvador - r - • * * 
B e l i z e - - -
Subtota l i 2 694 400 H h Z 272.3 Ü 2 ± i 
Rest of America 
Ecuador 1 3 9 1 100 21.0 1 0 9 . 1 17.3 
Colombia 240 OCO 3 .6 17.0 2 . 7 
Mart in iq j ie " * " " I55 OQO 2 . 3 - .... -24.-0 - 3 .8 
Jamaioa ' ' ! ' ; 1 0 9 - ' 4 0 0 ' - . 14.2 i 2 .2 
Others -•" ; ' .. , 612 400 « 
' • 9 .3 ; . : _ ' 8 2 . 3 " 1 3 . 0 
A s i a t j 777 8 0 0 1 1 . 7 65.4 1 0 . 3 
A f r i c a 4 1 9 9 0 0 6 . 3 . 4 3 . 8 6 .9 
Europe 25 1 0 0 0 . 4 3 .9 » . 7 
To ta l 6 625 l o o 1 0 0 . 0 632.0 100.0 
Source» Pood and A g r i c u l t u r e Organizat ion of the United Na t i ons , Trade Yearbook 1973. 
V o l . 27, Rome, 1974, pp . I 8 3 - I 8 6 . 
V Of which: A m o u n t V a l u e 
(metr io t o n e ) ( m i l l i o n s of tfS$) 
P h i l i p p i n e s 800 27.8 
China 250 000 32 .1 
Others 62 000 5.5 
/Europe and 
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Europe and North America are the principal importing countries and 
together with Japan»accounted for over 92."5 per cent of world banana 
imports by volume and 94.4 per cent by value -table 4. It is 
interesting to note that., ojf..the_ largeimporters, the United States is 
the only country in...vUii,Qh' its share of imported bananas by value is 
markedly less than its, share of imported bananas by volume. Thus, 
the United States pays iess pe,r ton of: (bananas imported than do the 
other major importing countries. Part of the reason for this may be the 
reduced freight costs jiue to closer proximity to producing countries. 
. . >>a.:i 
The destination'of bariaria exports •can be identified in Retail .for r . , • . . . •.  ; ... ..., • 
the United States market and. in fact a,lso 'for Canada, since the Canadian 
market is siipplied mainly frofa re-exports from the United States«.. 
Bananas are imported into the United States from East Coast, South5''" 
Coast, and West Coast "ports." "The imports^by companies into the 'Utfited 
States for 1972 and 1974 are shown in table 5. The origin. qf;, these;. i 
imports by b'otapanieS'and countries is as follows: 
Importing 
Company 
1. : : 
• i . 
tf'Shipmerit,i:from 
v,? 
United States " • 
Có'à&'t ' Óf entry ' ' ! " 
(S=South, E=Eaät, 
WöWest) KÀ J 
1. United Brânds 
Castle and 
Cooke 
3. Del Monte 
• Tela & Pto. Cortes,-
-« Hondur&s 
' •Puerto Armuelleö,- Panama 
• Öolfitov Costa Rica-
,.( ...Turbo,a Colombia ; -
Ebuador' • 
..  - ~A lmirante. .».„Eanama 
Ià: ' Geìba-Suila, • ; Honduras =.-. 







4. Pacific Fruit 
Co. 
5o Parker Banana 
6. Banana Supply 
7. Sucre Banana 
8. Turbana Banana 
9. Imperiai Banana 
Guayaquil, Ecuador 
Pto. Bolivar, Ecuador 
Turbo, Colombia 
Pto. Bolivar, Ecuador 






































Tabje 4 . 
• BANANA IMPORTS BY .QUANTITY.AND VALUE 
- : >973 
. ' f i •• Amount • ... Per-. Value Perr 
(me trio oent (million cent 
tons) ' 1atge J of US$) age 
world 
' .7 ' 'V: ' "i - ' : , • .•••.•; 
Europe 2 682 00b 42.9 541.1 * 56.7 
North America ' 2 177 000 •' . ' " 34.9. '* • 236.0 24.7 
. Asia . . . . 1 O66..OOO ... ;. 17 .1 .,. 140.3. , . :. 14.7 
South America 202 000 3 .2 20.3 ' 2.1 
Africa 6? 000 ' : : 1.5 '• . •••• 13.2-: • 1.5 
Oceania 26 000 . .0.4 . . 0.3 
Total : . .. .6 ,240 000 100.0 : 953.6 ... 100.0 
P r i n c i p a l Importers 
United States v 1 954 000' •'  3 l « 3 ! " • 197.5 • 20.7 
Japan • : - 931 000 14.9 122.7 - 12.9 
Germany Federa l Republio 676 000 . 1 0 ^ . 123.6 I 3 . 0 
Stance" , .'"'••" ' " 481 000 7 . 7 123.6 1 3 . « 
I t a l y 350 000 5.6 60.1 6.3 
United Kingdom 307 000 4.9 69.5 7 . 3 
Canada - '215 oOo 1 ' 3 . 4 ; • 37.7 " 4.Ö 
Netherlands 121 000 18.2 1 .9 
Belgium 1 ' ••• . 94 000 • 1.5 15.6 1.6 





000 836.8 94.4 
Source : Pood and Ag r i cu l tu re Organization Of the Uhlte'd Nat ions , Trade Yearbook 1973. 




UNITED STATES BANANA IMPORTS BY IMPORTINO COMPANIES' 
Company 
I572 •'•• • • ' • " - ' 197"+ 
Number of 
boxes 





P e r -
cent 
age 
Cas t l e and Cooke 38 03079I 36.89 43 7 9 9 8 I 6 40.69 
United F r u i t 46 116 464 44.73 39 293 492 36.50 
Del Monte Banana Company 9 8 6 1 452 9.56 ' 17 0 6 3 153 15.85 
Peiiiuneri oan 3 5 0 8 5 0 8 3.40 " 2 591 I37 2,41 
Parker Banana 1 568 6 1 7 I .52 1 671 058 1.55 
Banana Supply 1 2 9 3 6 9 8 I . 2 8 1 28 8 273 - 1 . 2 0 
Sucre Banana, • 7 0 2 023 0 . 6 8 337 2 9 6 0 . 3 1 
Turbana Banana 1 531 8 5 8 • 1.48 1 l oo 8 0 6 1 . 0 2 
Imperial Banana 285 8 6 6 0 . 2 7 2 8 4 9 2 1 0.2é 
C and S Imports 3 2 114 0 , 0 3 78 877 O.O7 
Nat iona l F r u i t - - 115 307 0 . 1 Î 
General T rop iea l i •• • 24 995 0.02 
0ther3 159 0 0 3 0 . 1 5 -
Tota l 1 0 3 0 9 0 394 99.99 107 649 131 99.99 
S o u cat Nat iona l Banana Assoc ia t ion , 
6o4 American Bank b u i l d i n g , 
New Or leans , Louis iana 70130 
/It should 
It should be noted that the three transnational ship bananas 
to the United States from South America, mainly from Ecuador, and are 
the sole'shippers from Central America, while the independent•shippers, 
(whose share of shipments to-the United States is about 10 per cent) 
ship only from Ecuador and_:Colombia. In the period January to 
April 1975-United States .ship.peid 5 million boxes less, than in the 
same period in 1974, Castle and Cooke 3.° 4 million boxes less and 
Del. Monte 0.2 million box.es less, while the independents increased 
their shipments by„ 1 = 3 million boxes. Thus Ecuador and Colombia 
improved their export position due to the independents and probably 
by way of shipments by the three transnational firms, while the 
Central American countries experienced declining banana exports» Part 
of this results from Hurricane Fifi.. in Honduras, and part from reduced 
shipments in response to the banana export tax, especially by United 
Brands in Panama.« 
. The position of Ecuador is crucial to any co-operative 
arrangements between banana producing-exporting countries. Ecuador, 
unlike the Central American countries, has little foreign investment 
in banana plantations and exports through about 30 Ecuadorean firms, 
five of which account for 80 per cent of total exports with two of 
these being the principal United States suppliers. In addition, 
foreign exchange"earnings from Ecuadorean-crude oil exceeded those for 
bananas for the first time in 1973, making "Ecuador less dependent on 
bananascl/ At the same time, unemployment,is a severe problem in 
Ecuador, and emphasis on banana production and exports must remain 
because the oil industry does not provide a large number of unskilled 
jobs» Thus, until the oil revenues can be used to create employment 
opportunities in other sectors of the economy, no moves will be made 
to curtail banana production» 




3« Associate Producers 
Associate Producers (APs) are national banana producers who are 
linked by some form of contractual arrangement to the transnational 
banana enterprises. A recent UNCTAD Report estimated banana acreage 
of APs related to each of. the three transnational fgr 1972-1973 (see 
table 6). 
In general,AP plantations are much smaller than the plantations of 
the TNCs. The APs have a contractual relationship with the TNCs 
whereby the TNCs supply, the APs with technical and managerial advice, 
fertilisers, boxes and other inputs, and contract to purchase the 
bananas produced by the APs from an agreed upon acreage. The AP 
plantations are usually owned by nationals who may manage the farms or 
hire managers. These managers are often ex-employees of the TNCs. 
However, this general picture is much more complex when 
individual cases are examined. In the case of Costa Rica, four foreign 
companies, Compañía Bananera de Costa Rica (United Brands), Standard •„•' 
Fruit (Castle and Cooke), BANDSCO (Del Monte) and Compañía Bananera 
Atlántica (COBAL) export bananas from company-owned plantations 
and from APs - table 7. In 197'', dependency on APs varied enormously: 
United Brands*, exports, from APs were 5 = 4 per cent of the company's 
total Costa Rican. exports for Castle and. Cooke 45.8 per cent, Del 
Monte 68.7 per cent, and COBAL 95=6 per cent. 
Apart from a 100 hectare farm used as an experimental station, 
COBAL, a German-owned firm,acts as, a marketing and distribution 
organization <*-.buying, transporting and marketing.bananas in-Germany. . 
Of the four foreign firms in Costa Rica it'makes the least direct 
contribution by way of linkage effects to the Costa Rican economy; it 
is unresponsive to host government pressures and has its APs totally 
dependent on it for marketing its bananas. At the same time, the 




ESTIMATE: .WORIi'D. BÀÎÎANA AREA. BY COUNTRIES AND 
• COMPANIES, AROUND 1972-1973 . . 






Assoc ia te 
Produoers 
Standard 










Asso « t ä t e 
Produoers 
Grand 








E eu ador 
Surinam 
Jamaica 
Windverd I s l and 




A s i a 
Ph i l i pp ine s 
Brand t o t a l 
Company share 
( pe r cen tage ! 
, 19 300 
26 450 
21 05« : 






- 4 5 0 0 
15 084 .6 334 
** - • - i 
15 '230 " 6 975' 




è 370 ** 
5 0 1 9 
• - u 855 
32 814 37 664 




• 2 5 3 0 9 7 0 0 
15 9I9 22 151 
7.2 




























Source» Data obtained by the UNCTAD Sec re t a r i a t from var ious sources , ( see UNCTAD, The Marketing and D i s t r i b u -
t ion System for Bananas, TD/B/C.1/162, p . 24 ) . " 
Notes. . Standard F r u i t s tates that i t s owned acreage i s misstated in th i s Table and did net exceed 26 000 a a r e s . 
a/ United F r u i t Company i s the banana d i v i s i o n of United Brands. . •• 
/Table 7 
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Tab le 7 
BANANA EXPORTS BY FOREIGN COMPANIES AND 
ASSOCIATE PRODUCERS FROM "COSTA RICà ; 
Cempany 
- 1 9 7 4 ' ' I 975 
Number of 
b o x e « 





P e r -
oent 
age 
Compañía Bananera de Costa R ida 
(Un i t ed B r a n d s ) 14 107 900 9 ^ . 6 12 020 000 9 3 . 2 
A s s o c i a t e p roducer s . 800 .000 .. , •• 5.H 88t . 000. 6 . 8 
S u b t o t a l 14 907 900 . 12 900 000 
Standard F r u i t Company 
(Qastl 'e and Cooke) l o 654 40« . 5 4 . 2 10 80c « 0 0 r 5 1 . 4 
A s s o c i a t e p roduoers 8 992 600 -, 4 5 . 8 , » 10 200 000 4 8 , 6 
S u b t o t a l 19 647 000 21 000 » 0 0 
BANDECO ( D e l Monte ) 4 152 500 3 1 . 3 ' 4 4oo 000 ' 3 0 . 7 
A s s o c i a t e d proctuteis 9 093 400 6 8 . 7 • 9 92 0 000 - 6 9 . 3 
S u b t o t a l 13 245 900 14 320 joo. 
Compañía Bananera A t l a n t i oa (C9BAL) 235 7 0 0 4*4 220 000 3 . 5 
A s s o c i a t e d p roducers 5 133 700 9 5 . 6 6 ooe 000 9 6 . 5 
S u b t o t a l 5 369 4oo 6 220 0 0 « 
T o t a l f o r e i g n companies , 2 9 1 5 0 . 5 0 0 5ÍU§ . . 27 44o 000 • -50 .4 
To ta l a s s o c i a t e d p roducer s 2 4 0 1 9 . 7 0 0 ¡ S a * 27 000 000 , Ü i s i 
. Grand t o t a l • 53 170 200 . 54 44o 000 . ; -
Sour 09 : Government ef Costa Rioa. 
Note's . T o t a l v a l u e ' a t US$l„7.46/box. US$ 92,8 . 9 5 . 1 . 
a / Boxes of 40 l b s . (18 .14 K G ) . 
b f Eatlrnated f i g u r e s . ' 
/Castle and 
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Castle and Cooke, through Standard Fruit, has the most legally-
complex relationship with its.APs .siiic.e in. maiiy^cases it owns 
20 per cent to So per cent of the APs* farms through a Costa Rican 
holding company. As a result.,-Castle "and Cooke shares: directly in" the 
profitability of some of its APs' operations. This may present a 
conflict for cojnpany i'n responding to host government policy 
measures'(such'as set price"'for bananas to- APs)-in that its tax-
position for its wholly-owned plantations may differ from that of its 
partly-owned APs. The wholly-owned plantations.usually operate under 
a concession agreement signed many years previously. 'On the other 
hand, Castle and'Cooke can manipulate the profitability of its' APs by 
altering the payments made by the APs to the company for. managerial and 
technical services and materials supplied such as fertiliser. In some 
countries, APs have to pay duty on imported materials aiid'-the TNCs do 
not because of" the terras of concession agreements. 
'-In the case^of United Brands.̂ - the APs are linked by a sales and 
service contract. As a result of these different contractual 
relationship^;, the foreign firm tends to respond differently to. any 
given, host government policy. The position and viability of APs 
are important in considering the policy options open to host governments. 
In 1971, in. Costa Rica, the government, the nationalized banks 
and the producers, (including the TNCs) became equal partners in a 
corporation known~as Asbana. This' company was fiaroed because of problems 
experienced by independent producers, including-.A'Ps'» in managing their 
operations.'These producers were often local entrepreneurs, living in 
the ci'ty" {kbsentee- owners) wrth l-it-tle-experiencê -in banana production, 
and many of whom went bankrupt. Asbana now provides technical 
expertise and financial assistance to independent producers and owns 
7,000 hectares of banana production lands. 
In terras of sale of bananas, the APs usually have a contract with 
a TNC for the sale of all bananas grown on a specified acreage. On 
the basis of this contract, loans can be arranged with local financial 
institutions. Inspection of banana quality is one way in which the TNCs 
can control the supply from the APs. 
A . The 
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The distribution and marketing of bananas 
: in the United States 
Distribution is the term applied to the process of moving goods 
from producer to the ultimate customer. It is usually thought of ita 
the physical sense. In marketing goods and services, however, much 
more than simple movement of physical objectsis necessary. Knowledge 
of who has the correct items," credit, service, arid technical informati 
are a few of the ingredients which must also be provided. A channel 
of distribution may be defined as a sequence Of marketing institutions 
including middlemen, which facilitate transactions between producers 
and final users. The number of"facilitating'institutions can be 
very small when the''producer sells directly to the user, or quite 
large, when several types of middlemen pe'rform successive operations 
in the product's distribution. The first case is called a short 
chánnel, the second a long channel. - ' 
Each channel éystém is designed to provide certain specific 
services. Channel length or complexity depends on the number of 
services required, and' the manner in which they'will be accomplished. 
Over the years,:specialists have developed within channels when 
certain services required greater attention than others. 1 •'• 
The structure of economic intermediaries (marketing middlemen), 
is fcbmplex, because time-space-communications activity requirements 
must be designed to effect efficient interaction among different 
types of producing and consuming units'. From the perspective' of the 
producers of bananas'; management of the distribution function' 
involves the adjustment of the mix of product, spatial considerations, 
local promotion, final buyer price, and quality maintenance. Since 
major banana producers work through marketing middlemen, the 
management function also includes' the design of c'on'trol procédures to 
/insure compliance 
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insure compliance on the.part .of.these middleman,with the corporate 
objectives and marketing stratégies 'of the producers. Inasmuch as 
banana: producers operate on an a-rmp-length basis with, thei.r marketing 
middlemen, their instruments of fç.ont.r$l are designed to. affect the 
behaviour of these middlemen. .A „major task, facing t.he producer is 
to ensure that the individual middleman's marketing strategy for .  . 
.bananas. is -apt,, in -conflict w,ith .the overall strategy o.f.the producer. 
•£his management task. is;.especially ..significant for banana 
producers- hecause. of past United States court sictipns which dissuade 
thejrit from-establishing corporate-owned distributive networks in. the 
United .States.;- ̂  Pripr. to.,the court actions whicjtuwere directed,, 
against the United-Fruit Company., the three, main stages in ¡the, 
marketing of bananas, in the „.United States -r importing, ripening and 
handling, and retailing r- were largely effected by the, banana producers. 
However, the power of the banana producers at the time legal action 
was first initiated .was virtually synonymous witji the power 
of the United Fr;uit Gompany. For. .example , .between 1950. and 1955-» 
United Fruit Company's. United:'States market, sĥ -re of bananas ranged, 
between- Gk per cent- and 80 per cent, with the regaining portion ... 
approximately evenly split between Standard Fruit and .independent 
"producers. .. .--... 
The . foregoing- United Fruit- Company market share is somewhat 
understated because-¡many of the independent producers were tied 
into the United Fruit. Company network of. operations. United Fruit 
Company had a near mono.poly position over -the production of bananas, 
¡and these so-called ."independents" were to an important extent dependent 
on,-United Fruit Company ¿for their, supplies,,, drawn largely from United 
Fruit Company- plantations ;and affiliates inTCentral and Latin America. 
Special sales deals were entered into,, constraining . the-activities of 
many of the "independents" in the United States. In addition, for all 
intents and purposes, United Fruit Company has a near market monopoly 
/of the 
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of the sale of bananas in.the United States. To ensure that the 
activities of the ripener-jobbers, the' marketing middlemen in the 
chain of distribution, conformed with the sales and marketing expectations 
of the United Fruit Company, this firm established two affiliate 
operations - Meloripe Company in Boston and Banana Selling Corporation 
in'Mobile, Alabama. 
Both companies were established before World V/ar II as ripener-
jobbing operations. In essence United Fruit Company integrated its 
operations forward into the distribution area.. The rationale for this 
decision was ostensibly to help improve ripening-and distribution methods 
on the part of the independent ripener-jobbers, by demonstrating their 
superior methods through corporate-owned facilities,. On the other hand, 
the perceived rationale of non-company observers was that United Fruit 
Company, through Meloripe and the Banana Selling Corporation was holding 
"a sword over the heads of the hundreds of independent jobbers." to ensure 
that their pricing methods conformed to those of the Corporation.. In 
effect United Fruit Company was saying that unless the sales activities 
of the independent jobbers conformed with the expectations/guidelines of 
United Fruit Company, the company might consider integrating fully into 
the marketing stage of ripening-distribution. Thus, the two company-
owned ripening-jobbing facilities functioned as both a threat and 
policeman in the United Fruit Company distributive network. With these 
powers, United Fruit Company,was the "channel captain" in the 
distribution and marketing of bananas. As channel captain,.United Fruit 
Company gave directions to and made demands on other channel members, 
namely the independent ripener-jobbers. It dictated prices, trade 
discounts, credit terms, amount of advertising and service, and sales 
and promotion effort. 
United Fruit Company's marketing powers in both factor and product 
markets came under attack in 195^, leading to the implementation of the 
consent decree signed in 1958» giving the company 12 years in which to 
satisfy the terms of the decree. An examination of the terms of the 
decree is a pre-reauisite to understanding the current distribution-
marketing arrangements employed by the three -TNC-banana producers in 
the United States, 
/The United 
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The United Frriit.Company and the 1938 Consent Decree 
In 195^ the United States.Department of Justice filed a civil : 
antitrust suit:against the United Fruit Company under Sections 1 
and 2 of the; Sherman Act and. Section 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act. 
It was-alleged that the United.Fruit Company "contracted, combined, 
and conspired to restrain interstate and foreign trade in bananas 
and"hiad' individually attempted to and had monopolized such trade over 
a number of years11.!/ . In 1956,, an ¡.amended complaint was filed and 
in 1958 'the Justice Department and. Uni,.ted Fruit Company agreed to a 
"Consent Decree11 which required, that United Fruit Company divest > v 
" r • 
itself o'f any ownership. of. International Railways of Central America; " 
, that United Fruit. Company liquidate its subsidiary, Banana Selling 
1 Corporation^ which had been, engaged in jobbing operations in Mobile", 
Alabama; and'that United Fruit Company submit a plan by June 30, 1966 
to turn over'to a new company operating independently of any United 
Fruit Company control, land and purchasing arrangements, and integrated 
facilities for shipping to and.distribution in the United States of 
nine million'stems (16 million boxes) of .bananas annually. Tlie 
Consent Decree also enjoined United Fruit Company from engaging in 
several activities. These included: 
(1) engaging in jobbing, operations 
(2) maintaining, exclusive sale..s contracts with jobbers 
or exclusive purchasing contracts with' independent 
banana suppliers for longer than-five years without 
any escape.clause 
(3) acquiring proprietorship,.ownership or control of any 
of its competitors or of any'substantial part of their . 
business assets :' 
(4) entering into collusive^ agreements with competitors, or 
using coercive tactics against them 
(.5) attempting to control the resale price policies of 
.jpbbers or other wholesalers ' ' • 
1/ Arthur et al, op. cit., p. 195» : 
'• . /(6) obtaining 
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(6) obtaining preclusive :treatment from common 
carriers,, r •• • = v .,. • .•  : ••;••'• •••• 'i,' ; •• .••*"• • 
(7) requiring :itsycus£;p.me-rs; to employ specified'transport -.. 
media .- .•.. - • 
(8) refusing to sell .in specified markets to any purchaser . , 
"" ' "'"St its"tegular 'terms of'sale suchbananas as" it might 
• . haveafter supplying the.-needs of. ¡.regular' customers " 
(9) tying up refrigerated space on vessels, other than -
through bareboat,^time or vpyage charters, in a , 
"' ' manner5 that vpi-evettts • ¿'ompeti tbr's frdm obtaining space 
>-» r.- needed :for; the.iar^shipments. 1/• .~ • .  ! . 
...: In agreeing to- the Consent Decreef United Fruit Company did , 
not admit any violation of ,,t-he arrtitrust . l a v / s and the Decree may " 
not be used as -e-vi4e.nce.-i-» any present or; future litigation. 2/ 
Implementation of the, Consent Decree , 
United- Fruit-Company liquidated its Jobbing operation, t-he : > 
Banana Selling Corporation, shortly after the consent decree, 
MeloripeJ:wa.s disposed of in 1955 .because -it wM- ostensibly art 
unprofitable operation -: ;;By the end. of; January «,1962:'all. stock 'in.' 
the International. Railways of Central America had been sold.J»/ 
19.65 .the. United .Fruit Company^ camfe to the-, conclusion "that 
since 1958 there -had- beefi .substantial and significant changes in ther 
banana industry which,WPMM .Justify a-request .for modifica'trrin oJ 
the Consent ,Decree<•- After a period of- consideration, the "Justices • 
Department turned, down the, .Te.qiuesti and United- Fruit-Company agreed ... 
to file a,.plan for-the-required divestiture .by-June 30, 1967of£/'- "> S* 
1/ May and Plaza, op. cit., pp. 252-253« f ' -
2/ Arthur et al'," oj>. citVy-p. . ...J• -
3/ Ibid., p. 195V - — - " - ' 
V Ibid., p. 195o 
— ••, •. • , /A plan 
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A plan was submitted in 196? whereby United Fruit Company 
organized a Delaware Corporation (Sovereign Fruit Company) to which 
it proposed !to transfer its western Panamá division at Puerto 
Armuelles, ships and other specified assets, to make provisions for 
terminals in the United States &nd to provide it with:personnel and 
working capital." United retained the right to sell Sovereign to a 
third party»1/ 
The plan presented-by United. Fruit Company was agreed to by the 
Justice Department and the Court but the Government of Panama indicated 
that it would not ágree with the divestiture of the property in the 
manner proposed.2/ As a result oí this development, United Fruit 
Company proposed" to the Justice Department the divestiture of 
banana properties in Guatemala. In '19-70 United Fruit Company- signed 
a letter of intent for the sale of these properties to Del Monte 
Corporation.3/ "-• '' '' •'•'"' * 
Del Monte tod'k advantage of the Conséht Decree in'another 
way in 1968. In that year United Fruit Company'acquired more 
than 700,000 share's of Del Monte stock; Del Monte suspected that 
United Fruit Company might be preparing for a takeover bid. To 
block this possibility Del Monte purchased West Indies Fruit Company, 
a small Costa Ricán banana producer' "and distributor.Since the 
Consent Decree had enjoined United 'Fruit Compan!̂  from acquiring 
ownership or control of any of its Competitors, the takeover ofJ 
Del Monte would become a- violation of the Consent Decree. Once 
Del Monte became established in the banana business it became a 





Securities and Exchange Commission, Form 8-K for United Brands 
Company, July 197*h p. 39. 
Ibid., p. 39. ' •• .".•••••'."•' 
United Brands Company, Annual rRepor.t, 1.970, p. .3̂ -. 




However in 1971, the government of- Guatemala refused to consent 
to the transfer of the Guatemalan properties -to Del;Mont.e. The 
government indicated, that it would only approve a transfer to a 
Guatemalan national or juridic person. United Fruit .reported,that ; 
negotiations with Del Monte were terminated.!/ I»'the meantime, Del -..• 
Monte entered into a contract with United Fruit to purchase 4-million 
boxes of bananas from United* s Guatemalan plantations.2/- , 
United Fruit Company reported that "certain Guatemalan nationals 
have indicated âh interest in acquiring the-properties and-discussions 
are being had with the Justice Department to develop:a plan on-how 
to proceed further with any possible transfer of the -Company's 
Guatemalan properties".3/:> In the end the Guatemalan government backed 
down. In December 1972 United sold its Guatemalan properties to-
Del Monte for 20.5 million dollars and the sale constituted sufficient 
divestment as required under the Consent Decree. 
With respect to the list of activities, from,which United is . 
enjoined from performing, the company has stated that these, 
restrictions do not have any material effect on" United's operations-
in general and do not conflict with its methods-of conducting its 
business.; Furthermore, the Consent Decree does not contain any. . •..•.. 
provision that seeks to regulate United1 s operation of its properties 
and facilities outside the United" States of which otherwise materially 
affects its foreign'operations.;4/' ' ; " 
1/ ,United Brand s ,C ompany 9 .Annual Re par t, 1971, p. 39? f • • 
2/ Business Week, June 1973. p* 55« , 
United Brands Company, Annual Report., .1971, . p. 39. , . 
4/ Securities and Exchange Commission, Form 8-K for United Brands 
~ Company, July 197.4» p. 39« 
! /Market Structure 
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Market Structure-¡and Competition .,, ,,. , 
In 1975 "the 'Unit'ed States banana importing market is dominated 
by three large United States TNCs, namely," United' Brands, Castle.and 
Cooke,' and Del Monte. "The 'emergence of-.Del Monte in recent years 
can be Attributed directly to the effects of the "Consent" decree. 
Table '8 provides 'a1 breakdòwn of thè''Unitèd States 'market shaire of 
the' three banana producers. Two'key^observations can be made -with 
respect 'to tliis data. Firsts Uni ted -Brand's share 'of 'the United-
Stàtes market fell sigriifioantly'from"the pre-corisent decree-days 
of 80 per Cent-to '36 A ; per' cent ' in l'97̂ i> 'Second', in 1973, -United " 
Brands was displaced b'y Castle:arid Cooke as the' leading supplier of 
banstjias iri•thè United States'market i. The rather - Significant shift 
in United States -nìàrkkt ' sharès-'between thè th^ee TNCs deserves some 
explanation. ' - • : ' ' " '- . i • • . . 
The period 19^0-1972' was one ;of'oversupply iri the United States 
banana market.' United' Brands' production-'in ' Pànama' increased 'sharply 
after replanting and- the company 's' total" expórts "increased by l^ -'per '-
cent between'197Ò and-Ì971. - United Brands ' ""market share remained 
stable at about ':45 per cent -until*a severe windstorm -hit the 
Honduran plantations in Hay 1973* This disaster-coincided with thè -
sale of; United Brandsf Guatemalan-division in-December 1972,- arid 
resulted in a 10 per cent drop in-"'Unit ed. Brands ' share of the Unitèd. 
States market in 1973- Castle and Cooke and'Del'Monte both increased, 
their market shares with Castle and Cooke taking over from United 
Brands as the largest banana importer in the United States. In 
1973} Castle and Cooke supplied per cent of American consumption 
compared to 3^-7 per cent for United Brands. 
United Brands remains the leading banana exporter in the world 
despite its losses in the United States market. Table 9 shows the 
company's dominant position between 1970-1972-. During tirat "period" • ~ 
United Brands was the largest "banana imp-ortèr'iri Canada, Switzerland, 
Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, Italy, Norway, Netherlands,- #es't Germany, 
Poland, and the United'Kingdom.- ' - ' '' 
; .. /Table 8 
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Tab le 8 
UNITED STATES MARKET -SHARE FOR MAJOR -BANANA - PRODUCERS : 
( P e r c e n t a g e s ) -
_ . Un i ted F r u i t / . Standard F r u i t / ^ , „ _ Independ 
TJouhtty " — ' : J- De l Moßtö — — ' ' 
Un i ted Brands • • C a s t l e and Gooka •.•;'. ents 
1950... .; 80,0 . 51 8w9 < 11.1 
1965 51.5 . 0 3.8 13.3 
1966 56.4 31.2 3.1 9.3 
1967 57.^ 30.1 2.0 lo®5 
1S68 55.7 33.3 14 '' 9.3 
1969 52.3 35.8 4^4 7.5 
1970 46.2 36.6 8.5 8.7 
1971 46.8 " '36.6 Ö.6 8.0 
1972 44.5 37.2 9.6 8.7 
1973 34.7 43.4 13.1 8.8 
1974 a/ 36.6 40,8 15.7 6.9 
1 S ou roe l A r t h u r , Houok and Beok fo rd , T rop i ca l ; A g r i b u s i n e s s S t r u c t u r e s and 'Ad jus tments , . '.. . : »; 
Harva rd , U n i v e r s i t y s Bos ton » I 968 , p « 156} and Castbo cjd Coclvs, Inc. (Data, 
presented i n OAS Exoout ive S e c r e t a r i a t f o r Eoonomie and S o o i a l A f f a i r s , 
., ' " S e o t o r a l Study of T r a n s n a t i o n a l E n t e r p r i s e s i r r l a t i n Amer ica » The Banana 
I n d u s - t r y " ) . 
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SHARES i^x^m^TICNM. ; OTHSR :Í<ARSE ̂ R f W A . ^ r M f f ^ J¡HE 
BANANA IMPORT TRADE OP SEIECTED COUNTRIES, i f t Q ^ l t f i 
ÍSSMÍW:9 "PX ( P e r cen tages ) 
> y inn!, - ; .,- ; rrt .--.-v: ^ 
^T^ansnat ional 'oorpor g.tipns i " • 
Country ; 
• t m p o r t s - l n - -
1970 -1572 
(thousands 




F r u i t 
D e l , 
Monte 
Sub 




To ta l 
Canada 
i 
205 65.O 30.0 5 .0 100.0 100.0 
United S ta t e s 1 900 36.O ' 4 2 . O 12.0 9 0 . 0 10.0 100.0 
Sw i t ze r l and 63 81.0 6 . 0 2.0 8 9 . 0 11.0 100.0 
Denmark 




17 .O I 9 . O 8 3 . 0 1 7 . 0 100,0 
Sweden 7 5 57.0 16. 0 i V 
6 . 0 7 9 . 0 21.0 100.0 
Belgium k 4 7 . 0 
ôp Ot 
2 5 . 0 6 . 0 ' 7 8 . 0 22.0 100,0 
I t a l y 300 4 5 . 0 3 1 . 0 2 . 0 7 8 . 0 22 .0 100.0 
Norvay x 5 4 . 0 1 7 . 0 3 . 0 X ^ 7 ^ . 0 2 6 . 0 100.0 •i . r 
Nether lands l o o 41 .0 2 1 . 0 10.0 7 2 . 0 28 .Ò ' 
^ 1 «T» 
100,0 
Germany F e d e r a l Repub l i c - . 6.0$ • 18.0; 1 0 . 0 , • - j o . o -, 100.0 
Poland 70.O i '" " foïo ' 30 .0 100 .0 
Japan . • .• 1 2 , 0 . M7>o... ... , - 5 3 . 0 100.0 
Uhited Kingdom 322 4o.o - - 4cr.'0 " 6 0 . 0 100.0 
Franoe 40+ 14.0 - - ' a 8 6 . 0 • .. 100.0 
Germany Democractic Repub l io 4o - - - 100,0 100.0 
New Zea land 24 - - - - 100.0 100 . « 
Tota l 5 234 33 «O 25.0 10.0 6 8 . 0 2M 100.0 
Souroe : F AO, Trade Yearbook) t r ade Bouroes , Reproduced from UNCTAD, The Marketing and D i s t r i b u t i o n System 
f o r Bananas, TD/B/C.1/162. 
a / Inc ludes s a l e s to a f f i l i a t e d en t e rp r i s e s and import and who lesa l e f i r a s i n consuming count r i e s « 
/Branding and 
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Branding and Product Differentiation 
Producers place names on their goods' Which are typically 
identified as their b¿*ari&s. There 'aré' many sourid marketing reasons 
for branding one's products. Thròùgh'the route of' identification,. 
brand ñames càh be effectively employed for sales' promotion purposes. 
For example, it is much easier to advertise a product which has ari 
identifiable brand name. ïf the product is successful and develops 
a market following, the brahd' riarne serves' to protect the ':firm's: •' 
markets. Brand identity áhd loyalty'by';eustomers generates custo'mer 
goodwill, and thus strengthens the manufacturer's marketing 
relationship with iiis marketing middlemen. " -' 
The strength of a firm's brand name''is '-a key factor in'-determining 
the producer's power'over his "independent" marketing middlemen'in 
the distribution system. High" acceptánce óf a' product'-by customers 
allows the manufacturer to be' the "'channel captain*' W d thereby' gain 
control ever the product's distribution'strategy. Success'taken,to 
an extreme' might result in the brand'nataë being used "as- the generic' 
term for the product,' e.g., "Chiquita1' =: bananas. Successthis '• 
instance could theoretically result in a situation.'where "independent" 
middlemen would believe that their commercial survival was dependent 
on their ability to obtaiii distribution lights in sufficrent 
quantities of preferred brands.- •>.-•• 
Product differentiation is usually-a key Component ' in a' 
producer's marketing strategy'designed to 'create and promote •• 
differences between his product and those of his competitors. The' 
difference may be real or ima¿xnéá;' the purpose," however, is' to-' ' 
convince1 '-the intended customer that the "differences" i:are significant. 
The'se differences may be éxpláinéd ïn terms o'f the physical ' • ••' 
characteristics of thé product,-'in its packaging,' in its br'and name, 
or in'the:way in which :it :is'promo'tedò" ' ';. 1 < 
Branding and product differentiation strategies in the.. United.... 
States banana market were first introduced in 1964. ' Until "that 
year it was impossible for the consumer to differentiate., between 
' t 
• ; ; /the bananas 
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the bananas of the various fruit ' ..Via4 t9.SU,John M.o.Fp?, 
who had taken over,the.position„of President, of. United Fruit', 
Company, ,initiated, a programme,, to, differentiate,,United Fruit ....... 
Company's bananas, frorji those of other producers..]/ This, was achieved 
by sorting out . top grade, bananas .iji .the tropics, and attaching blue 
adhesive brand labels, to them...,,Branding, of bananas ;was accompanied, 
by an extensive advertising., programme in. the United States, for 
"Chiquita",brand.bananas, yhiclj,,cl̂ iime4„tĥ t box,ing_ and, ,the. reduc.ed 
handling,,which it entailed:, resulted in.better quality: fruit for., the 
consumer. . ... ,, .,. „... •. .,....,,,„. .-.¡. .... . • 
Initially the strategy pf.,,product differentiation, by. branding 
.appears to haye.been successful. It is difficult', to determine 
whether,., branding increased United, Fruit Company's market share in. 
the banana, industry: because several, p.ther considerations were. . « 
important during this, period. (e«g., impact of Consent Decree).. 
However, Chiq.uita .brand bananas did ̂ command a> price, premium .over ... 
unbranded bananas of 1/2 to 2 cents per pound;depending on the 
market area and time of. year«2/ Furthermore,, some observers belie-ve. 
that the. branding and.advertising programme had,had.the effect of., ...... 
maintaining the ^otal demand for bananas. - In-terms of creating brand 
awareness the programme was extremely effectiverin that•over 80 per 
cent of the people polled by a market research firm•indicated, that ,-
they were., aware, of. the Chiquitar b r a n d . . •  , , . 
Since branding .was absent pjripr to 196^ and prices..were not.;,, 
relatively active.for good, quality bananas, it might, be argued . that 
United Fruit Company's product differentiation, strategy was a 
defensive one | namely,... to combat Castle and Cookef s,increasing. • • 
penetration of the United .States market* and tQ build product strength 
which could bemused: to. exercise greater marketing-influence, over, the • 
ripener-jobber by stimulating demand...for. Chiquita. bananas, at the 
1/ Business Week, . 8. July 1967, p. .92. ., . - . ,.- . 
2/ Arthur ,et »al, :pp..clt., . ,p., hh..,. ,... 
y Ibid., p. if3. 
• • • • ' /retail level. 
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retail level." There can be little' doiibt" 'that' United Fruit Company 
was pursuing a 'pull' rather than a' 'push' strategy, 'i.e., to' pull 
their brand into the retail store through the consumer by way of 
massive consumer advertising, as distinct" from pushing the brdnd 
into the retail store by offering the ripener-jobbers a higher 
margin and other incentives. '•" ~ 1 
It was not until about 1970 "that Castle and Cooke initiated 
a major brahd promotion programme. During the; latter part cff the 
1960s, Castle and Cooke pursued a push, trade-oriented approach 
(i.e., directing their Marketing efforts at the ripener-jobbers). ' 
One miajor ingredient of the trade-oriented approach wks the 
technical assistance extended by Castle and Cooke to its customers, 
especially food chains. In the mid-1960s food chains were Shifting 
their dependence from the old line banana jobbers, and Castle and 
Cooke was quick to assist them in establishing efficient ripening 
facilities. Another area of profitable assistance was Castle and 
Cooke's success in producing heavier boxes for its bananas which 
resulted in less bruising in transit as well as in a better grade 
of product.1/" One reason for this techtiical approach was explained 
in terms of Castle and'Cooke's market p^ketration which was riot 
broad enough to support a riationai advertising campaign. 
In 1971, Crastle and Cdoke decided'to' launch a national campaign 
to promote the "Dole" banana. It had' all the earmarks of a major : 
brand promotion campaign. Prior to that time, Castle' and Cooke used 
the "Cabana" brand for its bananas, introduced first in Western 
North America in April of 1969.2/ The Cabana brand was dropped in 
favour of. the "Dole" banana brand in January of 1972 which had the 
support of the largest advertising and promotion effort in the „ 
history vof Standard Fruit. The advertising and .promotion, budget 
exceeded 5 million dollars and the company's merchandising force 
was increased by 75 per cent in 1972 over the 19,71 contingents" 
1/ . Business Week, 16 June 1973. p. 5.4.,"_ "". 
2/ Advertising Age, 14 April 19̂ 9,; p.' 73- ' ' 
' * ' ^ /While it 
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While it would be (difficult-' to measure the exacrt impact of ,C.as,tle, r.. . 
and Copke'is promotional^ campaign on. its sale. pf. Dole bananas, .it , 
would be equally dangerous to underestimate; the beneficial impact, 
of the... marketing goodwill, transferred £rom the brand Dole, tp., the 
sale of-bananas, ;and'the favourable impact it had on, the.perception 
of ripener-jobbers familiar with the Dole brand; and the corporate 
marketing strength.,of.,Castle and' Cooke-. . .. 
. Undpub.tedly,, ¡the, brand promotion campaign of Dole was. aimed . 
at having, Castle aod.ppo.ke replace the marketing leadership of. 
United .Brands-. It did ihis^ in. 1$73** One aspect., of, the United • 
Brands leadership was evidenced by- the fact that industry pricing 
standards were usually quoted, as " 'Chiquita,1 less 2p. centŝ ,. or some , ? 
other, figure., . This, type ,of;. price quotation is no longer .universal ...,. 
in the United States banana industry.. . 
Del Monte, o.n the other hand, has yet to introduce, a major . .-. .,, 
national campaign.. Its position in 1975 is not. unlike that of 
Castle and Cooke prior to its first, national prpmotipnal campaign» 
It lacked a broad renough market base, to justify an investment in such 
a promotional strategy... .Del Monte,'s. .major banana market is primarily 
concentrated, in the-Eastern and, South-Eastern part, of ¡the. United 
States. However,- because of the.high, acceptance and recognition 
of the Del Monte food br,anid, -. jnu;merous requests are; being, made by 
ripener-jobbers for. the. Del; Mpnte banana in areas not currently 
serviced by the company.1/. - ( , .... - • '-. • 
Per capita decline' in consumption ••:.>-•. : 
Per capita consumption of bananas has steadily, declined since 
1950 - from 2UA pounds per head in 1950 to 18.3 pounds per head in 
1973-2/ The following reasons have been suggested to explain this 
secular decline: developments in food processing technology; the 
1/ Business Week, 16 June 1973, p. 5^. 
2/ Jacques ilusbaumer, The World Banana Economy: Prospects 'for ' "' : 
Change 19?b-19oO, IBRD, Cciiraodity Paper, N° 15,'Washington, 
February Appendix,. Table. 2. •.. t , a - \ • 
. .r p., /availability of 
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availability of larger and more complete supermarkets resulting in. 
less frequent shopping trips by housewives; the growing amount of 
home refrigerator and freezer capacity and> the belief that bananas 
may be more fattening than other fruits.1/ ' 
Brand promotion is being used. to.counteract the decline in per 
capita consumption of bananas., in the United States. Of the three 
firms, Castle and Cooke appears to be the most ¿ctive in this area 
in 1975., For example, Castle and Cooke is trying to capitalize on 
the marketing opportunities offered as a result of the increasing 
interest shown by United States consumers for low cost and healthy 
foods. Castle and Cooke is currently promoting bananas as an 
inexpensive and nutritional snack. The company's advertisements 
state that bananas are 100 per cent natural and low in calories. 
This campaign is also being aimed at the ripener-jobbers to 
sensitize them to the new marketing opportunities to be exploited 
by stressing the nutritional and cost features of the product. 
The brand promotion and.product differentiation strategies 
vary only slightly between the three banana producing companies. 
One major difference, however, should be highlighted. In the case 
of United Brands, the brand "Chiquita" applies to bananas only* 
while the Dole (Castle and Cooke) and Del Monte brands apply to 
many of the other products merchandised by the two companies. 
Nonetheless, the producers have two common objectives for their 
banana brand promotion programmes: first, to stimulate and increase 
per capita consumption of bananas,, and second to promote quality 
control at both the producing and ripening stages of production. 
At the producing stage, producers can use the brand standard as a . 
quality level for refusing sub-standard bananas, and in the ripening 
stage the producer can use the brand promotion quality image as a ,, 
vehicle for pressuring the ripener-jobbers to adhere to certain 
service standards (i.e., the ripening process). 
1/ J.P. Valles, The World Market for Bananas, 1964-1972, New York, 




There are essentially three types of ripener-jobbers who 
function as marketing intermediaries in the sale of bananas in the 
United States. They are as follows.: (a), largely, banana ripener- . 
jobbers; (b) full line produce ripener-jobbers; and (c) chain 
ripener-processors. The significance of each type of jobber as 
customers of the TNCs has,changed in recent years. Since the mid- r 
1960s supermarket chains have been increasingly investing in their 
own ripening facilities. The reasons for this trend are explained . 
in terms of the.chain's belief,.that by doing their own.ripening they 
are ensuring a higher quality banana, as well as doing it cheaper 
than the traditional ripener-jobber. •..;.. 
The traditional ripener-jobbers have also been undergoing 
certain organizational changes. Banana jobbers ,who are successful 
today are larger, many of them are diversifying their product line ; 
into the general are^ of fresh produce, they tend;.to use their own 
transport vehicles, handle competing banana lines,, and act as 
"fillers" for the chain ripener processors. The market share enjoyed, 
by the different types of banana ripener-jobbers, varies according 
to geographical, region. For example, the exclusive banana ripener- n 
jobber is a more dominant middleman in California than in Louisiana. 
Regardless of the type of jobber,, the TNCs pursue a marketing ., 
policy of working as closely,,^s possible with all jobbers to ensure 
that their ripening, distribution, and sales activities conform. 
closely to the producers' marketing strategies. The fact that the. 
jobber takes title to the product at dockside, and that the 
producer is precluded from performing the ripening-jobbing functions 





United Brands, Castle and Cooke and Del Monte have sales . 
offices located throughout the United States and in Canada. Sales 
and technical personnel of the TNCs perform the following 
activities:1/ 
(1) Assess the requirements and sales potential of individual 
customers. 
(2) Provide merchandising and display materials and advice« 
(3) Arrange special promotional events. 
(4) Provide advice and technical assistance on new banana 
ripening equipment, handling, storage and merchandising. 
These services are complementary to the major function of selling 
bananas, maintaining customer satisfaction and building a regular 
repeat trade.2/ 
The following casette illustrates some of these points by 
highlighting hovi one of the producers merchandises its bananas. 
"The Del Monte Banana Company" • • • 
The company is headquartered in Miami, Florida. Most of its 
bananas are harvested, washed, inspected, cut into clusters, branded 
with a Del Monte shield and boxed in strong, "fibre-board cartons in 
Costa Rica and Guatemala. Del Monte's fleet of eight "reefer" ships 
handles the transportation of its bananas from Central America 
docking at five Gulf and East Coast ports - Galveston, Mobile, Tampa, 
Charleston, and Wilmington, Delaware. Through these ports, the 
company supplies its hundreds of customers, largely chain store's, 
groups of independent grocers and banana wholesalers (ripener-
jobbers). Customers'' refrigerated trucks pick up orders at the 
docks. The transfer from" ship to the truck is managed by Del Monte 
sales and terminal personnel. 
1/ Arthur et al, op.cit., p. 34. 
2/ Ibid., p. 34. 
/Typically, the 
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Typically, the fruit is sold by telephone days prior to the 
arrival of the ships. Since bananas are a perishable commodity, 
the company must sell its output before it leaves the ship. Thus, 
anticipating market demand and available supply becomes a key 
challenge for the company's marketing organization. Each Thursday, 
the marketing staff analyzes the market for the coming week, taking 
into account last week's movement, the next week's expected arrivals 
and competitive pricing. On Friday morning, Del Monte Banana 
Company's sales force, both in Miami and its six regional offices 
- New York, Jacksonville, Mobile, Tampa, Galveston and Winnipeg 
(Canada) - take to the telephones. All day long the market is in 
a state of flux as the banana companies vie with one another for 
the customers' business. Usually by the end of the day, most of 
the next week's shipments are sold. The telephone calls continue 
daily until all the fruit is sold. The Miami office co-ordinates 
the sales effort, and accounts for a substantial portion of the 
company's weekly sales. To help increase the sales of bananas, the 
company offers a wide range of in-store promotional materials, and 
the company's technical representatives, regularly conduct seminars 
on proper processing, handling, and merchandising techniques fpr 
ripening room and store personnel. 
A prime concern-of all three TNCs is to develop close technical 
and sales relationships with their ripener-jobbers. Since the 
producers are obliged to operate on an arms-length basis with their 
United States customers, part of their marketing, strategy has been 
designed to develop a dependency relationship with their jobbers. 
In brief, the producers,are keen to have the jobber rely on their 
corporate infra-structure (engineering, market research, advertising 
and sales promotion support) for assistance. In this way, the 
jobber becomes an extension of the producer's marketing organization, 
thus allowing the producer to exercise control over his ripening and 
sales activities. For example, United Brands' "Chiquita1', customer .. 
services provides the following assistance to its customers: 
/l. Free 
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1. Free Engineering and' Consulting 
2. Ripening Assistance and Training . 
3« Warehouse Surveys 
4. Transportation Information 
5. Retail Seminars 
6. Back Room and Shelf Storage Surveys 
7. Banana Display Information 
8. Retail literature and Banana Ripening Manual. 
For example, in the area of "Engineering Assistance", United 
Brands has a large staff of engineers based in the -following- cities: 
New York, Chicago, New Orleans, Los Angeles and Montreal. Each 
office has at least one or two trained, engineers ready to provide 
assistance at no cost to the ripener-jobber in such areas as 
building a hew ripening room, renovating an old facility, training 
new personnel, warehouse, distribution and retail surveys or 
dealing with his customers' in-store handling problems. 
In the 1974 Annual Report of Castle and Cooke, Inc., 
management offered the following explanation of its corporate 
philosophy with reference to food products, including bananas: 
"Vertical Integration is a key ingredient, in Castle and 
Cooke's corporate strategy for profit stability and long-
term growth. It is one of the Company's major operational 
strengths, particularly in.our widespread.food activities« 
The concept of Vertical Integration can be defined as 
having management control over as. much of an operation's 
activity as possible - from growing the raw product 
through sale to the customer. The concept can be 
divided into four major components - source, processing, 
distribution and marketing. 
/Within Castle 
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Within Caatle and Cooke's food activities, the degree 
of integration varies from product to product. It is 
greatest in the Company's pineapple, banana and mushroom 
operations. With each of these, we grow our raw 
product, process and pack it, and handle the distribution 
and marketing. 
... In the distribution component, the Company operates 
a chain of strategically-located distribution centers 
across the United States to assure customer availability 
of processed products. For bananas, we operate a fleet 
or chartered ships to. carry the product to market at the 
peak of quality. 
For fresh foods - pineapple and mushrooms in addition to 
bananas - our marketing organization stresses assistance 
to the grocer in extending quality shelf life. This 
helps to maximize his profit as well as ours." 
:Although ripener-jbbbers function as independent marketing 
middlemen, the "independence" of the non-chain ripeners is one of 
degree determined in large measure on their size, product 
diversity, corporate strength, and above all on the importance 
of their banaha sales. It appears that all three TNCs are 
promoting a vertical marketing relationship with their middlemen, 
and that their programme of assistance is designed to develop an 
administered relationship in the vertical marketing system, 
since the consent decreee prevents them from engaging in company-
owned or long-term contractual vertical marketing arrangements. 
/5« Banana 
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5« Banana prices 
Average monthly data on the retail, wholesale and import prices 
of bananas in the United States are'available for the period 
January 1970 to April 1975.1/ .Figure 2-at .the-end of.-this section shows 
the trend of these prices over- the period and figure 3 charts the 
trend of gross wholesale margins ..between retail and wholesale prices 
(R-W), retail and import prices (R-M) and wholesale and import 
prices (W-M). t •••'•'•' s • 1 
Upon examination of price movements it is possible to separate 
the period into two sub-period^: January 1970 to March 1974 and • 
April 1974 to April 1975» The division between the two' sub-periods, 
April 1, 1974, coincides with the implementation of a banana export 
tax by Costa Rica, Panama, Honduras and Colombia. 
Table 10 reports the mean' values of the various price series 
and also the Standard deviation from the mean, a measure of variability. 
The ratio of the standard deviation to the mean provides a measure 
of the relative variability of different time series of prices. 
The following observations may be drawn from table 10. 
1) The mean value of the import price has risen from 2.88 dollars 
per box in the pre-tax period {'January 1970-March 1974)' to 3.84 dollars 
per box in the post-tax period '(April 1974-April 1975)°" The import 
price in April 1975 was 5.05 dollars per box. •'' 
2) The mean value of the wholesale price in the pre-tax period 
was 4.18 dollars per box. Data on wholesale prices are only available 
up to August 1975 when the price was 5-36 dollars per box.. As a 
result we have not calculated the mean post-tax wholesale price. 
3) The mean value of the retail price has risen from 6.31 dollars 
per box in the pre-tax period to 7-®6 dollars per box in the post-tax 
period. The retail price in April 1975 was 9.74 dollars per box. 
4) The variability of both import and retail prices as measured 
by the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean increased in the 
post-tax period. Therefore, banana prices have been not only higher 
but also more variable since the export tax. 




UNITED STATES BANANA FRICES AND MARGINS 1 MEANS AND VARIABILITY 
(? per 40 l b . b o x ) 
Tine period 
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Standard D e v i a t i o n ( S ^ ) 
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5) The "'.mean value of the gross wholesale margin (W-M) in the 
pre-tax period was 1.28 dollars per box«»' The gross wholesale margin 
in the most recent month available, August 1974, was 1.57 dollars 
per box. ' .'•'•' 
6) The mean value of the gross retail margin (R-W)in the pre-, 
tax period was 2.13 dollars per box; The gross retail margin in 
August 1974 was 2.21 dollars per 'box» -
7) The mean value of the grogs'margin between the retail price 
and the'import price (R-M) has' risen from 3*41 dollars per box in . . 
the pre-tax peridd to. 4.02 dollars per box in the post-tax period. . 
The gross margin between the retail price and the import price in 
April 1975 was 4.69 dollars per box. 
8) In the pre-tax period the gross wholesale margin exhibited 
(W-M) greater variability (as measured by the ratio of the standard 
deviation to the mean) than the gross retail margin. Also the gross 
retail margin exhibited greater variability than the gross margin 
between the retail price and the import price. : Taken together these 
observations suggest that while the gross margin between the retail 
and import price exhibited relatively small fluctuations in the pre-
tax period, the shares of the wholesaler and the retailer tended to be 
more variable and varied in opposite directions from one another. 
9) To verify the above statement the correlation coefficient 
between the gross wholesale margin (W-M) and the gross retail margin . 
(R-W) was calculated. The result was r — —«712-6:, indicating a strong 
negative correlation between the two series. 
The implication of this negative correlation is: as follows. The 
gross margin between the retail price and the import price was 
relatively stable in the pre-tax period. This gross margin (R-M) was 
divided between the wholesaler's margin (W-M) and the retailer's margin 
(R-W).. ;In periods of. excess demand the wholesaler's margin generally 
rose sharply while-.the .retailer's margin declined, leaving only a 
small change in the gross margin between retail and import prices (R-M). 
In periods-of excess supply the wholesaler's margin generally fell., 
whereas the retailer's margin would rise, once again leaving the (R-M) 
/margin almost 
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margin almost unchanged.' Therefore, in the pre-tax period wholesalers 
appear to have taken a.larger share of :the (R-.M) margin in periods 
of excess demand. 
This observation is consistent with the belief which prevailed 
in the banana marketing industry that consumers would exhibit 
resistance (to purchase) at, certain price levels. In shortage periods, 
therefore, retailers would absorb the higher wholesale prices by 
taking lower profits rather, than passing the full increase along to 
consumers. In periods-of oversupply, when wholesale prices dropped, 
retailers would maintain their prices and enjoy a greater profit« -
The Relationship Between Price and Volume 
Monthly data are available on the volume of United States banana 
imports frpm the National Banana Association of New Orleans. Table 11 
reports import volumes for selected months and calculates the value of 
these volumes at import, wholesale and retail prices. 
To calculate arc elasticities, observations for two. distinctive 
periods are required. The periods chosen should be similar in all 
respects other than the price ,and volume of bananas. Following is a 
summary of elasticities calculated for several pairs of months in 
1 9 a n d 1975. 
Import Price Retail Price 
Period 1 Period 2 Elasticity Elasticity 
Dec, 73 Dec. 7k. „02 .03 
Jan. ?k Jan. 75 .69 .92 -
Feb. 7^ Feb. 75 .83 1-38 
Mar. 7k Mar. -75 , .58 • .?3 
Apr. 7k Apr. 75 *2k ..- • .25 
There is a significant variation in the elasticity values over 
these pairs of months. A crude average of the import price elasticity 
is .k7 and the average retail price elasticity is . 6 6 . 
A better estimate of the elasticities is gained from using a 
longer time period. Instead of comparing two one month intervals, 









• f boxes 
Import Tiiholesale R e t a i l 
p r l o e F r i o e : p r i o e 
(M ) (W) ( R ) . 
D o l l a r s : p e r box 
Import 
v a l u e 
Vfholes&la 
va lue 
R e t a i l 
v a lúe 
M i l l i o n of d o l l a r s 
R e t a i l 
v a l u e -
import 
va lue 
December I972 „7.57 2.72 . 6.04 , . 20 .59 . 29.9? 45.72 25. I3 
December 1973 8.1+0 2 .83 6.24 23.77 . • • • 52.42 28.65 
January .1974 9.48 .. . 3.C7 4.50 . 6.64 . 29 .10 42.66 62.94 33.84 
February .1974 10,14 . 2.94 4 . 29 , 6 . 6 0 29 .81 43.50 66 .92 37.11 
March V f tk 10 .85 ,2.6o 4.24 5.68 28 .21 46.00 61.63 33.*+2 
A p r i l I97I+ 8 .83 • • 2 . 8 9 4.43 5.75, ., ,25.52 39.12 50.77 25.25 
December I 974 8 .38 3 . 1 7 • • • 6 . 8 0 , „26.5Ä . • • • 56.98 30.42 
January I975 8 .25 3.75 • • • 7.72 30.94 • • • 63.69 32.75 
February 1975 7 . 3 0 . 4.37 ' 8.36 ; 31 .90 61.02 29.12 
March I975 7.68 4.77 • • • 9.16 36.63 • •• 70.35 33.72 
A p r i l 1975 7.76 5.05 • • • 9.74 39.19 , ' • • • 75.58 36.39 
Souroe : United States Bureau of Labour S t a t i s t i o s and Na t i ona l Banana A s soc i a t i on . 
/December 1973-
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December 19?3-April 197^ and. December 197^-April .1975= Using, 
these two periods we calculated the following:l/ 
Import-Price Elasticity - -.50 - - • . 
Retail-Pric-e Elasticity .62 
Other studies of the price elasticity of bananas have proceeded 
by" specifying ah equation to estimate the price of bananas with the 
quantity of bananas as an. independent variable., „Then the coefficient .. .. 
of the. quantity, variable is the.reciprocal of the elasticity. 
Arthur et al estimated such an equation,» . 
According to this calculation both import and retail prices, are .-/ 
inelastic, i.e., at the range of. output under consideration an increase, 
in the. import price will result in an increase in the value of banana ,, 
imports and an increase in the .retail pr,ice will result in an increase 
in the retail v$lue. of bananas. . ... 
1/ All elasticity estimates are arc elasticities calculated 
- by the fallowing formulae:' '•••' 
. nm =^2 - A . m2 : > 1 






* ^2 E1 " R2 
2 2 
The arc elasticities calculated for the period December 1973- April 
197k to December 197^-April 1975 use these two formulae. Prices 
are a weighted average of the four monthly prices in each period, 
weighted by the volume sold in the month in question. Quantities 
are the sums over the five month period, 
where Q^ = quantity in the first period 
M^ = import price in the first period 
R^ = retail price in the first period 
N = arc elasticity 
Note also that adjustments have not been made for income changes 
or changes in the price of competing fruits. 
Comparable import and retail price elasticities for 12 pairs of 
months, June 1973-May 197^ and June 197^-May 1975 are 0.27 and 0.25-
/The retail 
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The retail price, appears to have been slightly, less inelastic 
than the import price over "the period studied«. This fact has an 
important implication which is illustrated by the column in table 11 
which reports retail minus import value» As .banana prices have 
increased between 1974 and 1975 the difference, between the retail 
and import value has remained about the same. The total retail value 
minus import value for the first four months of 1975 was 131°99 million 
dollars compared" to'129»62 million dollars for the first four months 
of 1974. Therefore, the increase in the gross margin between retail 
and import prices was offset proportionally by the decrease in import 
volume'« This implies that wholesalers and retailers have not enjoyed 
any increase in their gross revenues as a result of the price increases. 
An increase may have accrued to the importing companies. 
Castle & Cooke Estimate of Volume - .Price Relationship 
In early 1974 when the Latin American banana producing countries 
were discussing the formation of a ,-Producers' Association and the 
implementation of export taxes, Castle Co.oke, Ii}C'.., prepared a 
statement entitled "United States' Banana Volume - Price Relationship 
1973-1974".. The purposes of the statement were to. investigate "the 
volume-price relationship of bananas in the United States market" and 
to investigate "the effect on the cost .o.f the product of both the 
proposed 1.00 dollar'per box tax and that,of diminishing volume as 
price must be raised to cover costs"." > 
The statement•claims that: 
"To achieve (import) prices of'5»15 dollars, 5°4o dollars, 
5°76 dollars and 6.-90 dollars., it is our considered opinion that 
the average weekly volumes would have to be limited to 
1,350,000; 1,200,000; 1,000,000 and 770,000 and assumes no tax-
free fruit available. These numbers would produce annual volumes 
of 70,000,000; 62,000,000; 52,000,000 and 40,000,000 compared to 
the 104,900,000 forty pound boxes imported in 1973, or a volume 
reduction of 33, 4l, 50 and 62 per cent." 
From these estimates it is possible to calculate the import 
price elasticity which Castle & Cooke, Inc. implied. 
/Import Price 
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" import Price-Range" ' r Import" Price Elasticity-
(DSS/box) | " ' , ' ' ' ' 
2.99A - 5»15 ' " ! 0.75 ; ' 
5.15 - 5.40 ' ., , 2.48 
5.40 - 5»76 ' ' 2.82 
..../. 5.76 - 6.90 ' " 1.44" 
• 2 . 9 9 ' was the average import price in 1975«. 
Over the first price range, 2..99-̂ 5° 15 dollars, Castle & Cooke 
implies an import price elasticity,, estimate of 0.75.« This compares 
to the. açtR&l import price elasticity .calculated, earlier of 0=54, which 
was measured over a- price range, of 2«60-5.0.5 dollars. Over each of 
the three higher price ranges postulated by Castle & Cooke, the company 
estimates that import demand is price elastic;i However, it should be 
noted that thé import priceé used as'examples by Castle & Cooke are 
substantially higher than tfto'se which ëx'isted between January 1974 
and April 1975. Only in April 1975 did import prices exceed 5»00 dollars 
per box. At that time'the import' price was 5»05 dollars and the 
weekly volume averagéd approximately 1,900,000 boxes. Castle & Cooke Inc. 
forecast that an import price of 5^15 dollars -per-box would require ; 
that imports be limited to 1,550,000 boxes per -week. In summary, the 
company's estimates of the import price elasticity.seems to be biased 
upward. Not only was the company'S 'estimate over the 2.99-5»55 dollar 
price range higher than the actual import price elasticity calculated 
over a similar p'rice rangé, but stlso- their estimate of the import 
volume consistent with an import;price of 5«15 dollars appears to 
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Part II 
PROFILES OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS OPERATING 
. . .. I.N CENTRAL. AMERICA AND PANAMA .. _ 
i. United Brands ' ~ " 
United Brands Company is a diversified food company which 
was'formed;''ih 1970'by the merger of^AMK Corporation and the1" ' "•• 
United Fruit Company. United Brands (U.B.) had -sales; of almost 
two billion dollars- in 1973'of which bananas accounted for about'— ' 
2.3 per cent,_ (see table 12). In 1973 U.B. was also involved in . .. 
meat packing (63 per cent of sales), petrochemicals (7 per cent of 
s^les) and several other operations including food services, 
floriculture, lettuce growing, communications and transportation 
services» 
The United Fryiit Company _ (UFC-),. was incorporated in New Jersey 
in 1899« The history of the company from its inception until 
1958 is available in May and Plaza's book. The United Fruit Company, 
in Latin America. At the close of the 1930s UFC was experiencing 
difficulties on its banana plantations due to Panama disease.1/ 
UFC attempted to control Panama disease by a flood-fallowing 
technique and by simply abandoning stricken areas. The cost of 
replanting Gros Michel bananas by I960 was approximately US& 18 
million per year.£/ Largely due to Panama disease UFC profits 
steadily declined during the 1950s, as follows, on page 59: 
1/ So May and G. Plaza, The United Fruit Company in Latin America, 
National Planning Assoc., Washington, D.C., 1958, p. 
2/ H.B. Arthur, J.P. Houck, G.L. Beckford, Tropical Agribusiness 
Structures and Adjustments - Bananas, Harvard University, 




UNITED BRANDS COMPANY 
(Sa le s In m i l l i o n of US$) 
Revenues by product 1570 1 9 7 1 1972 1973 1974 
Bananas and r e l a t e d produots 379.6 397.6 450 .7 4 5 0 , 0 549.4 
Pood process ing and se rv ioes . . 66*6 149.8 6 8 . 3 67.6 103.5 
United States a g r i c u l t u r e and 
f l o r i c u l t u r e 29.6 42.6 42*5 48.4 5 1 . « 
Other " ' 9 .0 11.8 13.2 17.3 27.6 
Meat packing and r e l a t e d 
preduots .v • . 8 9 8 . 9 '847.1 • 1 012,2 1 258.4 1 2 8 9 . 0 
Fos te r Grant Company - - - 140.6 -
Tota l '• 1 w 1 448.9 ' 1 586,9 1 9 8 2 . 3 2 020.5 
Sour 09 8 Annual Reports, o f - the ...Company, 
/Year 
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V & QY* Sales Profits Equity Profit Return 
' ( u s ¿ m) ' (US'] m) ' (US$ ra) Margin'(%) Equity 
1950 312 65.7 307 21.1 21. If 
1952 ' " 373 37.7 323 10.1 11.7 
195^ i 323 31.5 . 3^3 . 9*8 9.2 
1956 3M* 30.3 355 8.8 ' 8.5 
1957 3^2 31A 358 ; • -9.2 ' ' '8.8 
1958 32'!- 22.7 ,356 7.0 .. ,6.k 
1959 312 12.1 35^ 3-9 ' * k 
I960 •• 30k 2.2- ' 291 ' 0 . 7 0 .8 
Source: Moodies Industrial Manual; 1968o 
UFC experienced a change in management in 1959 when 
Mr. Thomas E. Sunderland became President, Chief Executive Officer 
and a member of the Board of Directors. Sunderland developed a 
strategy designed to turn around the operations of UFC. In áddition 
to the poor performance of UFC, Mr. Sunderland had to deal with a 
1953 Federal Consent Decree which required, among other things, 
that UFC divest itself of a sizeable portion of its banana operations 
by June 30, 1966. 
Turnaround at United Fruit Company, 1968-1969 
Sunderland made several crucial organizational and operational 
changes which revolutionized the banana industry. First, he 
reorganized the management structure of UFC-.l/ Previously there 
had been very little co-ordination among the operations of various 
divisions within the company. Sunderland consolidated management 
headquarters in Boston and created a Management Committee composed 
of executives from each of UFC's divisions« Then realizing that 
UFC lacked the required top executive manpower Sunderland attracted 
John M. Fox, president of the Minute Maid Corporation where Fox had 
pioneered in marketing frozen orange ' ;juice, and Herbert C. Cornuelle, 
president of the Dole Corporation, a large pineapple producer which 
was taken over by Castle and Cooke", Inc., in 1961. Fox became 
Executive Vice-President and Cornuelle was named Vice-President. 
1/ Business Week, July 8, 1967, pp. 90-9*+« 
/Sunderland, Fox 
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Sunderland, F93C and Qornuelìe then proceeded to implement some' 
of Sunderland's ideas-about reorganizing banana operations. 
Immediate cost-cutting policies' included thè consolidation 
of accounting activities, shutdown of marginal plantations and 
better co-ordination of cutting.to ensure that banana boats wouid 
sail only with a full ;load. Plans were déveloped to ,dispose of 
assets which were no longer required for UFC's activities. 
But the company's major problem was Panama disease. Over the 
period 1950-1960 when Panama disease seriously, .infected the Central 
American plantations, Ecuador became the.largest source of U.S. 
imports of bananas. Ecuador's market share rose from 12.5 per cent 
in I95O to 25°9 pei" cent by 1956 and to 44.6 per cent in I960. 
Ecuadorian bananas were cheap and plentiful but suffered from variable 
quality and the longer distance to the U.S. market compared with 
Central American fruit. Several banana, industry specialists advocated 
that UFC purchase its entire market requirements from Ecuador thereby 
eliminating.the financial drain caused by Panama disease.1/ However, 
UFC's investments in banana plantations and infrastructure, mainly 
in Central America, amounted to US$ 335. million in 1.955 which was J „ , t 
equivalent to 75 per cent of UFC's total fixed'assets.'^/ In addition 
to the size, of UFC's investment in Central Am,erica, other factors 
to be. considered included the proximity of the Central American 
plantations which reduced transit time and eliminated canal tolls, 
and., the competitive advantage of owning several geographically 
separate plantations so that plant disease, blowdowns, labour 
problems or political upheavals in one area would not seriously 
affect UFC's ability to meet market demand. As a result, Mr. Sunderland 
favoured continuing production in Central America and reducing UFC 
purchases of Ecuadorian fruit.3/ However, this was only possible if 
1/ Arthur, Houck, Beckford, op..cit., p. 148. 
2j May and Plaza, op.cit., p. 108. 
3/ Arthur, Houck, Beckford, op.cit., p. 148. 
/Panama disease 
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Panama disease could be controlled« Thè Standard Fruit and Steamship 
Company, which due to smaller landholdings thari UFC was unable to 
simply abandon disease-stricken plantations, 'Was'forced to switch 
from the Gros Michel variety of banana to the Giant Cavendish, a 
disease resistant strain. UFC was réiuótant to make this switch 
because the Giant Cavendish was more fragile and perishable and 
often arrived at the U.S. markèt'in damaged condition* 
The problem was solved in I960 when the company's research 
department discovered the Valéry variety of banana which was a 
disease resistant plant of.the Cavendish type. Other advantages of 
the Valéry included less risk of blowdowri due to the plant's lower 
height, high quality and high'yields. However, like the Giant 
Cavendish, the Valéry is fragile and easily bruised when shipped 
on the stem. Mr. Sunderland decided to shift ¿ompletely; from the 
Gros Michel to the Valéry and to begin destemming and boxing the 
fruit at the plantation.!/ The destemming operation had previously 
been performed by the ripener-jobber. The fruit companies thereby 
took over an operation which they could not perform in the 
United States due to the 1958 Consent Decree. Furthermore, destemming 
and rejection of poor quality bananas in the tropics reduced*weight 
and shipping costs; : ; Boxing in the. „tropics with-relatively low •  -
priced labour-also made brand labelling of bananas; an.attractive 
prospect. " ; . : : . ••'..,.;.. .: . - •• , 
Until 1964,. it was. impossible.;:f.or the c.onsumer to differentiate 
between.'the bananàs of the various fruit companies.^ In . that year -
John M;! Fox, who had taken, over the position of President of UFC,. . 
initiated a programme to diff erentiatc UFC-'c bananas from those of 
other producers.¿/ This was afchfleved by sorting out top grade bananas, 
in the tropics and attaching blue adhesive brand labels to them. 
1/ Ibid., pp. 149-151» « 
2/ Business Week, July 8, Ì967,~p. 92. 
- ' /Branding of 
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Branding of bananas was accompanied by an extensive advertising programme 
in the United States.for "Chiquita" brand bananas, which claimed that 
boxing and the reduced handling which it entailed resulted in better, 
quality fruit .for ,the:consumer* 
The combined effect of these several, programmes initiated by 
Sunderland, Fox and Cornuelle was to improve dramatically, the revenues 
and profitability of UFC in the period 1961-1968 .oveap the levels 
recorded in 1,96.0. as shown by the following: 
• 1 







. (%) t1 
Return on 
Equity (%) 
1961 311 . • 6.0-, . . 295 . 2.6 2.7 
1962, 320 10.7 299 . 3.3 3.6 
1963 330 ' (0:.5) 283 (0.2) (0.2) 
1964. 333 3,0 . 271 . 0-.9 1.1 
1965 399 15.1 274 3.8 5.5 
1966 ' 440' 25.0'' ' 285 ' 5.7 8.8 
196?; • 489- 32.1- 313 .'.: : 6.6 . , 10.3 • -
1968 510 31-7 334 6.2 9.5 
Source:, Moodies Industrial Manual., 1968. 
AMK Corporation' and the. Takeover of the United Fruit- Co. 
The turnaround of the United.Fruit Company attracted the 
attention of Mr. Eli M. Black, President of the rapidly growing-AMK • 
Corporation. UFC had not only increased its profitability, i.t. had 
also accumulated US$ 100 million -in cash and marketable securities.' ' 
UFC's net worth was about US$ 350 million, the company had no long-term 
debt, and the price earnings ratio of 15 was considered -low by..financial 
analysts.l/~ This combination attracted the attention of several 
acquisition-seeking -firms. 
1/ "How United Fruit was Plucked", Business Week, February-22,- 1969, 
"" p. 122. r . ; ; - -•«.:-. 
/AMK Corporation 
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- AMK Corporation had originally been a producer, of cardboard 
caps for glass "milk bottles. Eli Black took'over control of the 
Company1 in the early sixties and, after a period" of reorganization 
and "acquisitionsAMK had become a machinery manufacturer, with 
sales of about US$ kO million per yékr. In 196? AMK acquired. 
John Morreir & Co., an -¿ssetrrich meat-packing company which was 
experiencing operating difficulties "and low profits. Morrell was • 
twenty times larger than AMK,-having annual gross revenues of-
US$ 800 million annually., Fortune magazine reported: 
"After that coupv an operating man would have immediately 
turned his attention to tightening up Morrell, and fitting 
it into the parent structure. But not Black. He' leaves 
problems like that to others. In fact, he was just 
weighing the takeover of Great,American Holding Corp., an 
insurance complex when the United Fruit deal was brought to 
his attention."!/ 
Black's usual practice was to confer with the management of 
the company he hoped to acquire before purchasing any of the 
company's stock. However, in the case of UFC, it was rumoured that 
another company was about to make a tender offer, so Black made a 
single purchase from a New York brokerage 'firth of 733,200 shares 
of UFC stock at US$ 56 which was US$ 4 above the market price.2/ 
Next, he purchased an additional 7,100 shares òn the open market 
and increased "his holdings to 9 per cent ofUFC's shares. Shortly 
thereafter Black dined with John M. Fox who had become chairman and 
chief executive officer of UFC. Black expressed his admiration 
for Fox's feat of turning UFC around1. However, Fox's initial 
reaction was to oppose the AMK takeover bid. Fox began to seek 
other potential buyers for UFC including Dillingham Corp., a Hawaiian 
1/ "United Fruit's Shotgun Marriage", Fortune, April 1969, p. 133« 
2/ Ibid., p. 134. 
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based*.construction, arid real estate firm which Herbert Cornuell.e, UFC 
president, had. become, familiar with .when he, was.--presidentpf Pole ;,„.>., 
Corp.,. and. Text-ron, Inc.,. a New England-based conglomerate. •;. Te-xtmp.. 
proposed a'2 ¡for.M share pffer but ,thi«--was voted.tdovm by Textron ; • , 
shareholders" who felt that the- o&flgr was-;.tP0 highi. • . :. 
Another f irm,. Zapata:-Nornsss, rlnc.of. Houston :&p|>rpaohed 
Fox -the day after ¡Black's-purchase.-of 9 per-Cent Dillingham-'. 
eventually dropped, out- and' it: becamie apparent that either AMK' or 
Zapata was going to- win control-^pf • UFC.. ;Zapat.a; demanded; that it; 
have a: majority on UFC's .board-,whereas AMK asked, only for. minority 
representation. Eventually Fox gave in to Black and AMK, dismissing 
Zapata's offer:, as- mot-. being in'the. best - interest pf .the shareholders. 
Fox al's.Q.'came .around ;to agjx".e4'.' with' Slack t̂ ifet' AMKt and UFC would do 
well together. He said: "UFC will bring operating 6xp.eri.ence,and 
the . ability to turn things around to this new company and jjlMK will 
bring the ability to use, assets.. .Operating men, do not have the time, 
to do financial things that Eli Black, .can do". 1/ Following the 
takeover Fox became vice-chairman of £MK and Cornuelle became ... , 
president and .chief executive officer of .UFC., 
AMK had won the takeover battle but. to do so it had. to, outbid 
its rivals and ended up paying a. very, high, price to gain contrpl .of 
UFC. Before Black's original purchase of US$ 56. a share UFC had. 
been trading at US$ 52. As .other firms .entered the auction and. 
revealed .their intentions to acquire UFC ,the share price began to 
rise and eventually hit USjf 88.2/ Asa result AMK. paid much more 
for UFC than the book value of the company's assets - US$, 252.9 million 
more, to be precise. One. business periodical, noted, that this, was . 
"an incredibly high value to attach to the reputation, trademarks 
and patents of. a company that even in a good y^ar when there, .wejre • 
no hurricanes had difficulty earning a decent return on its assets"»3/ 
1/ Business Week, February 22, 1969, p. 122. 
y Fortune, April 1969, p. 191. 
3/ Forbes, April 15, 1973, p. 44. 
/In 1970 
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In 1970 the Accounting Principles Board issued a new ruling, APB 
Opinion 17, which states that a company must write off over à period 
of 40 years any over-payment in the acquisition òf a business 
- sometimes called intangible "goodwill". Under this ruling AMK 
would have had to amortize USS 252.9 million over 40 years which would 
result in a drain on earnings of about' US$ 6 milìiòn'per year. 
Fortunately for AMK, however UFC Was acquired prior to APB Opinion 17 
C, • . . . 
and therefore the US$ 252.9 million is not being written off at alii 
In June, 1970, Eli Black merged AMK and .UFC in orderto form" 
a new company,' United Brands (UB). Just prior to the merger the 
Federal Trade Commission announced that it intended to institute 
proceedings against AMK to compel it.to divest itself of its 
83 per cent interest in UFC, and against UFC to divest itself of 
interests in the domestic fresh prodube business, primarily'iceberg" 
lettuce.l/ Following the mergeri Eli" Black became Chairman of thè 
Board and Chief Executive Officer òf UB, John M. Fox was named 
President of both UB and the UFC division, and Herbert Cornuelle 
departed from the baiiana division and went to Dillingham Corp., 
Mr. J.A. Taylor became senior Vice-President of the banana'divisioh 
of UFC. 
In 1969 a hurricane hit the company's banana plantations in 
Panama and Honduras. Extraordinary losses due to hurricane and 
flood damage amounted to US$ 10.6 million in 1969, US$ 8.6 million 
in 1970 and US$ 1.0 million in 1971.^ 
During 1970, United Brands signed a letter of intent to sell 
its Guatemalan banana operations to Del Monte Corporation to comply 
with the 1958" Consent Decree.However, negotiations with-Del Monte 
were terminated in 1971 when the government of Guatemala refused to 
consent to the sale. Government officials indicated that for any such 
1/ "Bold Start for AMK and United Fruit", Business Week, 
July 4, 1970, p. 22. 
2/ United Brands Company, Annual Reports, 1970, 1971. 
y United Brands Company, Annual Reports, 1970, 1971, 1972. 
/sale to 
sale to be acceptable it, would have. to,, be to a. Guatemalan national. 
According t<? theUB;annual, report for 19.71-; certain Guatemalan 
nationals were, interested in acquiring:the properties and discussions 
on the matter, witja the Justice; Department ye re underway? In.the 
meantime., TJB. entered into a contract with Pel^Monte to sell four-
million boxes of bananas to the latter over the period June 1971 
to December 19?2.. Negotiations apparently were reopened in 1972 and 
on December 15, 1972 ,the,; Guatemalan properties were.. sold to Del, Monte 
for USS ' 20.5 million.^/ 4 .. >r ¡ 
Several management changes were made at UB.in.the.early 1970s. 
In 1971, J-M. Fox who had been president of the. .banana group resigned. 
In the Who's Who' in America - 19-72-1973.,' Fox was listed as a director 
and consultant at. jttp. , Ifowevé-r, his name was absent from the-, list 
of; directors in- the,. 1972 Annual/Report. The departure. of; Fox completed 
the exodus of all qf the top management personnel of the sixties. 
Sunderland, Fox and Cornuelle, the three banana operations and 
marke/ting experts,-were- gone. . .,.. .-• 
, United Brand-Si'- performance over the period 1969-1973 is .shown 
as follows: •• •; . • , . . . Í •-. 
Year Sales •-'-Pi 6fit - -Equity ' -Profit - ' 'Return on; ... (USS -m.) (USS m) .XUSft .m), . M.arg,ifl. (%) Equity (%) 
1969 1 189 28.7 "513 2.4 
1970 1 384 (2.1) 505 -- (0.2); 
1971. 1 374 (24.0) r ..478 ... (1.7X 
1972 1 587 17.7 494 J 1.1" 
1973 -I 982 •• 25'¿'4' 517 : - 1.3-c 





1/ Moodies Industrial.Manual, 1974, p. 28 
c/The banana ; 
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The banana group of UB showed thé'" following résults: 





• • r 




1969 • 555 " .: 28.7 • 355. •5.2 8.0 . ., 
1970 . 380 27.4 k N.A. .7-2 N.A. 
1971 - 398 11.2* NiA. --2*8 N.A. 
1972 451 34.7ft N.A. 7-7 N.A. 
1973 . 450 26.3* N.A. .5-8 N.A. 
1974 ' N.A. (7.5) N.A. 
. -V 
N.A". '' 
k/ Income from Operations before unallocated corporate 
overhead and extraordinary items. 
These figures indicate that the banana group at UB has been 
profitable relative to the other divisions of the company. Substantial 
extraordinary losses were experienced during this period partly due 
to hurricane and flood damage and a fleet replacement programme.1/ 
In 1974, 'the banana group made a loss of USÉ 7.5 million. ' 
During the 1969-1973" period the company's sources of banana 
supplies for export underwent some important changes as shdwn in 
tables 13 and 14. Honduras' production was relatively low in 1970 
due to thé. effects;of Hurricane Francelia; which struck in September 
1969. Both Panama-and Honduras suffered severe flooding--in 1970. 
These disasters cut UFC's banana production during'the season when 
demand was at its peak. By the time production was restored, 
competition had made serious inroads into UFC's share of the North 
American market during the first half of the year. Plantations 
returned to near full production in the second half, but this only 
added to a market glut. The results were lower banana prices and 
greatly reduced revenue and profit contribution for the year.2/ 
1/ United Brands Company, Annual Reports, 1970, 1971. 
2/ Ibid.', 1970, p. 7. 
"•''•'" /Table 13 
Tabid 13 
ORIOIN OF UNITED BRAN3S! SUPPLIES FOR EXPORT . 
( M i l l i o n b o x e s ) 
196? 1970 1971 1972 1973 iffif 
Panama 












; •' 4.4 
















£isL 21.1 29.6 25 f 6 19.0 12si 
Cesta R i e a 
Produoed 
tHl'rohased 




14.2 ; -1. 











... 1 * ° , = . 2o7 
•j- • M - • 8.8 • 10.8 . • Ihl: ,2dL: ; . M. 
Subtotal . 2M. • 7hl • 2 M m .. .. 68a 
Other 14.4 9.7 7.9 • 10.7 18.1 • ... 30.1 
•" Total mi : 87.9 3M. 86.2 • 88;6 
Sauroe : Un i t ed Brands« 
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Tafela l U 
ORIGIN OP UNITED BRANDS' SUPPLIES FOE EXPORT 
(Percentage) 
196? 1970 1971 1972 1973 . 197̂  •t 
Panama ; 
Produoed 22 27 v. 25 .25 •-. 27 20 
Purchased 12 9 8 7 6 '5 
T & : > •22 32 21 . 25. £ 
Honduras 
Produoed 1? . 17 23 20 16 17 
Purchased ' 8 7 ' 7 6 6' ' 5 
Ä ' - & 2è 22 22. 
Coata Rica • - j- • • 
Produoed 16 19 18 18 19 lé 
. Purohased . .. • . - • - ' •1 • : 1 
16 ¿2. , .... 18, : Ü , • ¿2 
Guatemala • - ' - . 
Produoed > 8. 9 . 11 ; -
Purchased 1 1 2 1 h 3 
1 is. 11 
. ' •i 
12 it • ,4 
Ecuador - 1 2 11 13 
Colombia 12 8 3 2 3 i i 
P h i l i p p i n e s - 1 2 4 7 
Other - purchased 2 2 2 ' 3' . 3 • 3 
100 ioo 100 ioo 100 100 
Breakdown by 
owierahi-o: : 
: Company ' 
production 
• 72 r 7.5 7t 62 53-
Assoc i a t e 
product ion 33 27 23 22 - 23 •31' 
Other purchases 0 , ; .1 . . ' • ;• ' 2 ., - r ** -. ' ; - 16 
Source; United Brands* 
/Table- 8 
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Table 8 shows that UB' s share of the: United' S-tâtes market fell 
from 55»7 per cent to 46.2 per cent' between 1968 and 1970. The 
period 1970-1972 " was one" of over supply ' i'n̂ He*TTnxïè1i~'SïaTès'',bàl̂ fô 
market. -United-Brands' production-iruHondiir-as increased sharply after 
replanting and the company's total exports increased by 12 per cent 
between 1970 and 1971« United Brands* market share •remained,'s?'table 
at about 45 per cent until a severe windstorm hit the Honduran 
i"> " V i 
plantation's in May'1973» ïhis disaster coincided with the sale of 
United Brands' Guatemalan division in December 1972, and resulted 
in a 10 per cent drop in UB's share of the United States market in 
1973« Castle & Cooke and Del Monte both increased their market share 
with Castle & Cooke taking over from UB as the largest banana., importer 
in the United States. .-.•;.-
United Brands remains the leading banana exporter in "the world 
despite it's losses^ in the United States maiket. Table 9 notes the 
company's dominant position in the 1970-1972 period. During that 
period, UB was thé largest' banana importer in Canada, Switzerland, 
Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, Italy, Norway,- Netherlands, West Germany, 
* ' L. 
Poland and the United Kingdom. 
As indicated by UB's financial statements, the company has not 
achieved a respectable net profit margin in recent years. Over the 
period 1970-1974, the period since the AMK-UFC merger, UB has 
experienced, a total net loss of US$ 26.6 million. The company's 
total revenues over"the period amounted to US$ 8.3 billion. Nineteen 
seventy-three was the company's best year when it earned a net-income 
of US$ 25.4 million on revenues of US$ 1.98 billion. However,.. UB 
would have suffered a net loss in 1973 in the absence of''a complex 
financial:manoeuvre implemented by-Eli Black. In November 1972, the 
Accounting Principles Board issued a new ruling, APB Opinion 26, 
which stated that as of January 1, 1973 any difference in principal 
arising from any early extinguishment of debt must be flowed through 
current earnings in one year.l/ 
1/ "The Numbers Game", Forbes, April 15, 1973, p. 42. 
/United Brands 
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United Brands had 5,1/2 per,..cent convertible subordinated 
debentures with face value of US$ 125,. million which were scheduled 
to come due in 1994. The actual market.value of these bonds, which 
had USU 100 face value, was about,US$ 61 in late .1972. . Black: decided 
to renegotiate this debt,in the.following fashion. For every 
US$ 100 in face value on .the old bonds, UB would give US$ 9 in .  
cash and.US$ 60 in.face v^lue oii a new 9 1/8 per cent bond which 
would come due in 1998. From the.point of view of the bondholders, 
this offer was attractive because the interest, payments on. the new 
bond (9 1/8 per cent on US$ 60) would be the same as they were on -
the old bond (5 1/2 per cent on US$ 100) whereas the curreht,.value 
of the new cash and bond package .(US! 60 + USi 9) would be higher 
than the market value of the old bonds (,US$ ,6l) .1/ 
From UB's point of view, the swap, appeared attractive because 
it would add to current pre-tax earnings and reduce the company's 
debt by US$ 50 million as well. .How much would.the renegotiation 
add to pre-tax earnings? The amount would be US$ 50 million 
(the difference in principal arising from the early extinguishment 
of debt) less the cash paid to the bondholders (about USS 11.2 million). 
That left US& 38.8 million to be added to pre-tax earnings, the 
exact amount added as an extraordinary gain in the company's .1973 
financial statements.2/ 
Black appeared to have created 39 million by, a bond 
renegotiation. However, critics pointed.out that this gain was 
simply an accounting adjustment. But because of APB Opinion 26, Black 
was able to record a pre-tax gain of US$ 39 million, all in 1973» 
This manoeuvre lifted UB from yet another year of losses to a net 
income of US$ 2'5.4 million after , taxes. 
1/ Ibid., p. 42. 
2/ United Brands, Annual Report, 1973» P- 33« 
/By early 
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£y early :1.974;, UB\s Honduran -plartta-.tTon's hadrrelSirne'd' -to full 
production aftejr a severe; blowdown in- May -1973 • This-incriesead: 
production, together with; increased imports-b'y Del'Monte and Castle-
& C.ooice, created- a state of oye!rsupp,ly and depressed" prices in the 
banana markets»,!/ In March 1974,.;.-seven Latin Airieritan nations• 
(Colombia, Costa. Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala-, Honduras Nicaragua and 
Panama).-signed the "Panama Agreement" whereby: they ;agreed in' v • ;•-• 
principle i;p implement an export -tax; of United States 2.5 c/lb ' « 
effective April 1, .1974. However, on.-Apr.il .1* ; 1974 . .the folldwingi.' 
taxes were imposed: ..Colombia - 40 c/box, Honduras 50c/box, "' 
Costa Rica and Panama - US# 1.00/bp^. ;.~.The . other signatories -'Ecuddor, 
Nicaragua, and Guatemala - did not impose a tax*2/,;. •• J-
In Honduras the tax was reduce^ to 25c/box after protest from< 
the.fruit companies. However, the.^Honduran tax calls for annual 
increments .of 5c/box until ...the-tax peaches ,.50c/box in-1979 In'-'" 
Panama, the export ,;tax.-was dropped to 3.5'e/bax effective October 21'?/1974. 
Confrpntations between |he fruit companies and the- exporting' ; 
nations were referred to as' the ''Banana War" by the-¡press... "John-Taylor, 
President of UB'..s,..bananaoperations .-.§aid that the---c ampany' s current' 
operating contracts specifically protected the', company frdm having- to 
pay export,.ta.xe;s°3/..r.; - • • • •'•"'• 
United Brands began to accrue funds undef^-p^t^st to pay the' 
export taxes in Panama. The ̂ company.-offered to; pay- the, ̂ Panamanian 
government, in guaranteed certificates rather than cash but -the1 ' " 
government refused to accept the certificates. • As'a -resultUB -refused 
to pay-the tax. The government then- confiscated US|' 3»9 million' ' 
1/ Ibid. , p. 5. -. .-••. .. ... 
2/ Jacques Nusbaumer, The World Banana Economy: Prospects for Change 
1974 - 1980, IBRD., Commodity Paper NO 15, Washington, D.C., 
February 1975, p. 14. ' 
3/ "United Brands Says it Fears Panama Would Seize Boats'5, -New York ' 
Times, August 5, 1974, p. 35. . . . .. .. .. -•- .' 
/which UB 
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which UB had deposited in escrow at the National Bank of Panama and 
which UB originally intended to use to pay the export tax.. The * 
company responded by halting export shipments from Panama.1/ Company. ' 
officials instructed their banana.boats not to put in to Panama 
harbours for fear the government would seize thé boats. The .Minister 
of Industry, and Commerce, Fernando Manfredo stated that negotiations, 
over payment of the tax would not begin until. UB continued exporting. 
The tax being imposed at the time was US$ 1.00/box. . . • , . 
Eli Black reiterated the company's position tha.t the export . , 
taxes violated the provisions, of existing agreements. He said 
that UB recognized Panama's need for' additional revenues and was 
prepared to negotiate a reasonable formula. However, he demanded 
that tax negotiations must be resumed before export shipments 
would be continued. Furthermore, he stated that UB had not. offered 
to sell its banana operations to Panama. 
Government officials in Panama said that the country would 
carry its confrontation with UB to "the bitter end". The government 
denied that it had illegally confiscated UB funds and stated that a 
contract signed by United Fruit Company and Panama in 1927 calls for 
the company to pay export taxes after 1957 as the law deems necessary.2/ 
The government decided to purchase the properties .of the 
Chiriqui Land Co., UB's Panamanian subsidiary, as soon as the company 
resumed shipments. A national citizens front in support of the 
banana workers and the government held its first meeting on August 5, 
1974. A programme was organized to mobilize private and State aid to 
nearly 2,000 banana workers and their families affected by the 
company's suspension of banana exports. Food and medical supplies-
were trucked and flown to the plantations.J/ ' '., ., 
1/ "United Brands says Panama Fund Removal led Shipment Halt"', 
Wall Street Journal, August.,12, .1974, p. 1,0.'. ; : 
2/ "Panama, to continue Fruit Company Fight", Latin -American .Digest, 
October 1974, p. 18. .... 
¿/ "Panama Taking Steps to Buy Subsidiary", The Journal of .Commerce : 
August 6,. 1974. • : . " : . . 
" ' /Eventually tax ' 
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Eventually, tax negotiations resumed "and the export tax was lowered 
from US$ 1.00 to 35c/box. Banana shipments resumed early' in September 
after a six-week stoppa'ge. By autumn, the fruit companies ha!s also 
managed to have the export taxes' ' in Honduras Jahd'Costa ,'Ric'a lowered, to 
35c/box.l/ EcUadoi remained unwilling to ;foin: .Other banana-producing 
countries, in imposing higher export taxes. 
In late September, Hurricane Fifi hit in Honduras.2/ '"At the UB 
plantation in the Sula Valley," 24,000 out of' 28,000* acres were 
d e s t r o y e d .A large quantity of boxed bananas stored in warehouses was 
also destroyed- The-bahana crop was not insured. United Brands' pier 
remained operable but there wafe'damage to1the railway and other 
facilities which were insured. Originally, there was some fear that , 
U& and Standard Fruit might'abandon Honduras due to'the combined impact 
of the hurricane and the export tax. However, a UB official, Mr. Lacombe, 
said that UB's investment' in' Honduras was close'to %fJS# 100 million and 
the company would not leave. 
On October 11, 1974, UB announced that the dividend on preferred 
shares would be postposed due to losses from the Honduran hurricane and 
the export taxes.4/ On November 12, UB made its third quarter financial 
report. The company announced that revenues for the quarter had increased 
from US$ 496 million in'the third quarter of 1973 to US$ 524 million. 
However, the company suffered a net loss of USS 47.2 million in the 
third quarter resulting in a US$ 40.2 million loss for the first nine 
monthfe of 1974. The loss 'due to 1 HUrricdne'Fi'fi was US$ 20*mill ion net 
of insurance, and banana taxes for the'third quarter amounted to 
USS 11 million.5/ ' "'"'"' ' : ' 
1/ "Panama is resuming Banana Shipments", New York- Times, September 7i 
. 1974, p. 15« - • • - l 
2/ "United Brands says Hurricane Damage to Cut Net"-, Wall Street 
... Journal, September 24, 1974, p. 19 
J/ "Honduras likely to need Two Years to Recoup Losses", New York 
. Times, September 27, 1974,. .--p-; 17. ' 
it/ New York Times, October 11, 1974, p. 37« 
"United Brands Reports Net Loss for Quarter", New York Times, 
November 12, 1974, p. 6l. 
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The third ..quarter loss at UB placed t.he company in financial : 
difficulty.. Working,capital^had,decreased,17 per cent; fro® •. v ,.' •* •. 
USS, ?00.1 million at the end,of. 1973, to^USl. 1^5 million late in. 197:4»1/ 
United Brands decided to,cancel dividend payments for: the. fourth 
quarter of 1974= Eli Black saw the necessity of selling .¿ff some of,-, 
the company's assess. Reluctantly,, he decided to eell^Foster Grant Co. 
- a petrochemical subsidiary which UB had acquir.e^ in the latter: ' 
part of 1972 and which Black had referred .to .as '/the -crown j.ewel of 
our company".2/ Foster Grant had contributed only 7' per.-..©exit; ,to 
total revenues in 1973 but accounted fo,r almost 24 per cent„of the " 
income. However,. UB's banks were, pressuring the company -to ¡sell . 
something because iJS was running .low ,on,.,the cash it needed tp'keejp up . 
payment on loans «J/ , • ? ¡ - ... ... 
The sale of Foster Gran,t. to the German company , Hqpchst, was 
announced on December 20. For tax. purposes,; the details -off the' sale 
had to be. and were completed by the end of December, 1974o4/ ',-.In 
what economist Eliot Janeway called ."a striking, financial success"<,5/ -
Black negotiated-the sale of Foster. Grant, for US.$ 70 million ;having 
paid USS 49 million in 1972.6/ .. , _ , 
On January 1, 1975» the government of Panama took, over 30:,000 ! 
acres of uncultivated lanid formerly h^ld by the Chiriqui Land Company. 
This was the first step in the transfer, pf Chiriqui's .assets, to „the.-. - ; 
government which would be completed in 3-4 years, and would give -the \ 
1/ "United Brands-;trade§ More Assets for Cash"', Business Week,' 
January 13, 1975, pp. 35-36.. , . : . • ... • • •  . ; " 
2/ Ibid., p. 35« ... v • +,.. i •-". y 
¿/ "Suicide of Big Executive: Stress of Corporate Life"; New York Times, 
February 14, 1975, p. 1. "r"" ' .' " 
4/ "Was Eli Black's Death Caused by the Tensions of Conflicting" 
Worlds.!!, Wall Street Journal, February 14, • 1975', p. 1. i - ' 
1/ New York Times, February 14, 1975, p. 1. ' . . 
6/ Business Week., January 13, 1.975, p. 35» . • 
• * • " /government! total-'•'•-.- • -
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government total"'owneréh'ip ofUB's plantations. However, there 
was disagreement over the value of ChiriqUi's assets." The company 
.valued thern at US$100 million while the government said that' their . 
book value was US&' million.1/ ' 
On February 4, 1975» Eli Black committed- suicide by jumping 
. out.the window of his" New York office^2/ Company officials said 
that he was ''under great' strain bécáuse' of business pressures". 
Edward Gelsthorpe* the chief ©pérat'ing" officer of UB, said that 
under Black's leadership1 "the company Was on its way to., overcoming 
its-several.crises"» The business-pressures Were said to be 
attributable to the sale of Foster Grant and to Black's agreement 
at the end of December, to negotiate the sale of UB's-Panátna holdings. 
At the end of March 1975, UB announced its financial results 
for 1974. The company's sales increased'9.8 per cent 'from US$ 1.84 
billion in 1973 to 2.02 billion in 1974. However,' UB experienced 
a loss.of' US& 71-3 million from"continuing operations and a net 
loss of US$ 43.6 million after extraordinary items. Banana operations 
resulted in a loss of US& 6.6 million in the fourth quarter of 1974 
and banana export taxes amounted to USS 2.8 million. In addition; 
the company took out of production about 3,000 acres of marginal 
.banana land resulting in a fourth quarter charge of about 
US$ .2 million.^/ '. : i: 
'. Following' Black's -death, JVE. Goldman was named temporary" 
head of the Executive Committee and a new Management Committee.4/• • 
In March, .the board hired a New York executive-search company 
to find it a new Chief Executive.5/ This company presented seven 
;!/• Facts on File, March 1, 1975,: p.' 168. . 
2/ "44 Story Plunge Kills Head of United Brands'", New York Times, 
February 4., 1975, P- 'l-
J5/ "United Brands Posts Big Loss from Operations", Wall'Street, 
Journal, March 28, 1975, p» 20. ' 
4/ New York Times, February 11, 1975, P- 55. 
¿/ "United Brands Co. Elects Booth President and Chief, and Fisher 
Acting Chairman", Wall Street Journal, May 13, 1975, P»3« 
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" , • 
candidates from which the board of directors unanimously endorsed 
Mr. Wallace W. Booth as the new Chief Executive on May 13. Booth 
had been senior Vice-President and a member of the board and 
Executive.-Committee of Rockwell International Corp*.. He has a -
reputation for.:being a very s.trong. financial.. manager. 
The board oî ,UB_also^annpunçedjthat. Mr.. Max M. Fisher had 
been named acting chairman while Mr. Booth became familiar with the 
company. Mr. Fishér is described 'as a multimillionaire independent 
investor who was elected to the board on April 2» Also in April, 
a New York financier, Seymour Milstein, purchased k per cent of 
UB's common stock and won a board seat. 
On May 7, the European Economic Community charged UB with 
anti-trust violations in the European' market. The EEC charged that 
UB had broken Common Market rules by favouring some banana wholesalers 
over others in Denmark and Ireland.1/ 
On May 21, Costa Rican foreign minister Gonzalo Facio chàrged 
that Standard Fruit, United Brands and Del Monte conspired against 
Central American banana producing states to' keep them from raising 
export taxes._2/ The foreign minister said. that he had heard unconfirmed 
reports that the three companies had established a US$ 5 million 
secret fund to destabilize UBEC member countries that had 
recommended export taxes. Ail three companies denied the accusation. 
The following tables 15, 16 and 17 provide some further data 
from various sources on UB's holdings in Central America, UB's 
employment, and taxes paid by UB in Central America. 
1/ "United Brands Accused by Europeans", New York Times,. May 7» 1975, 
p. 63. 
2/ "Costa Hica Accuses Castle.& Cooke Unit, Del Monte, United Brands 
of Conspiracy", Wall Street Journal, May 21, 1975, p. 6. 
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: Table 15 
. UNITED BRANÇS IN CENTRAL. AMERICA AND PANAMA, ,. 
'' :i (aè of April 1972) 
Guatemala Honduras Manama Nicaragua ^osta Colombia 
Land • ' 
(acres) . ,. '6$.;QOOa/ 191 000 1Q7 000 -- ' • , ' 228'000' ' 900 
Corrugated- . • .=. ••:.•<*•.•.;' • ••••.. - v . ' 
Box Plant x jt f . ., ,. . ,..x ..; • . 
Food Oil ......... ,: ... 
Plant ''•''"• x ••'.-•••••• x 'x 
Plastics' ' ' . ̂  ....... • 
Plant .>.,• . - •, x • . . ' • . x •; : i--. 'i' x ' 
Banana . •''••" \ • ' • '. .•• . :>'; "• "•' •'•'•'• 
Puree .. • 
Plant ' '* '"' ' x"' ' ' x " * " . ' . 
Palm Oil ' ' " 1 :'v" ~ ' 
Plant x ••.•'• - 2 
1)' " ". ; 1 .; ;' 1 ; . • " • ' " i' 1 '. ' 1 1 . i '' ' '. • • T*" V." • 
Source: New York Times, April 24, 1975, .P.» 1», 
a/ Sold to Del. Monter in December 1.972«. •'• . , . . . . . , , 
Table- 16-
BANANA INDUSTRY' 
(Employment: United Brands) 
Panama Costa Rica Honduras Guatemala 
1970 13 625 10 19.6 14 863 4 827 
1971 12 538 8 107 14 543. 4 675 
19-72 10 621 . ' 8 1 5 8 12- 943 - - A 507 ! 
1973,. -9 693. • 7 985. ' 1 2 •'894. , 71 
Source : OAS,Executive Secretariat for Economic and Social Affairs, 
"Sectoral*Study of Transnational Enterprises in 
Latin America: The Banana Industry", 1974, p. 53» 
/Table 17 
